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Introduction
Scholars, legal advisors and students working on the jus ad bellum oft en face 
a daunting challenge pulling together relevant primary materials. Indeed, while 
a number of key sources are relatively easy to consult (Security Council meet-
ing records and most other UN documents are readily accessible through the 
UN Offi  cial Documentation System), others are dispersed and at times diffi  -
cult to identify. While a handful of states publish national digests of practice 
in international law,1 the vast majority do not. Furthermore, in contrast to the 
law of armed confl ict,2 there is no international institution that consistently 
keeps track of relevant practice. As a result, identifying exchanges of claims 
and counter-claims—or even establishing the relevant facts—can be a cumber-
some exercise. Th is is particularly the case in relation to small-scale incidents 
that generate little or no international attention.
Th e aim of the present ‘Digest of State Practice’ is precisely to address this 
lacuna and to provide a tool for scholars, legal advisors and students by system-
atically collecting all relevant state practice and opinio iuris in the fi eld of the 
jus ad bellum on a periodic basis.  By so doing, the Digest aspires to facilitate 
methodological rigour in academic research. It also aims at promoting a better 
understanding of the normative framework and its underlying challenges by 
* Co-editor-in-chief. Suggestions and input for future Digests of State Practice can be sent to Tom.
Ruys@UGent.Be (at any time).
1 See, in particular, the ‘Digest of United States Practice in International Law’, published by the 
US State Department, www.state.gov/s/l/c8183.htm (accessed 20 May 2014). As is well known, 
several academic journals moreover exist that keep track of a specifi c state’s practice in inter-
national law (eg American Journal of International Law, Revue belge de droit international, Revue 
générale de droit international public, German Yearbook of International Law, etc.).
2 See the Customary Law Database of the International Committee of the Red Cross at www.icrc.
org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/home.
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addressing relevant practice and opinio that may remain below the academic 
radar, namely more small-scale incidents (as opposed to large-scale military 
interventions) or practice of various ‘non-Western’ states.
Th e Digest provides a periodic descriptive overview of relevant evolutions in 
state practice and opinio iuris. In other words, the goal is not to provide criti-
cal assessments of specifi c interventions, new security doctrines, etc (which will 
receive ample attention in the articles published in this journal), but rather to 
bring together the relevant sources in a structured and transparent manner.
As far as its scope is concerned, the Digest does not claim exhaustivity, but 
has the ambition to provide as comprehensive an overview of relevant prac-
tice and opinio as possible. It covers unilateral uses of force (irrespective of the 
justifi cation put forward) and Security Council-authorised Chapter VII opera-
tions, as well as interventions by invitation, ‘rescue of nationals’ operations, etc. 
Consensual peacekeeping operations and forcible actions that take place in the 
context of a purely non-international armed confl ict are, in principle, excluded. 
Furthermore, the Digest will cover both ‘verbal’ and ‘physical’ practice. It will 
also deal with both ‘concrete’ instances involving forcible intervention, as well 
as more ‘abstract’ practice (eg debates within the UN General Assembly that are 
not directly linked to a specifi c case of use of force). In other words, attention is 
paid not only to (i) military interventions that give rise to diplomatic exchanges 
(whether or not at the UN level), but also to (ii) military interventions (includ-
ing small-scale cross-border uses of force) that are not accompanied by any 
‘verbal’ practice. Last but not least, the Digest details (iii) strictly ‘verbal’ prac-
tice, whether at the international, regional or national level (eg national military 
doctrines or domestic legislation).
Th e compilation of this Digest draws heavily on the input received from a 
group of ‘regional co-ordinators’, each of whom tracks relevant evolutions in one 
of several regions (the Americas; Europe; Asia and Oceania; Northern Africa 
and the Middle East; Sub-Saharan Africa). Th e journal editors-in-chief there-
fore wish to express their sincere gratitude to those ‘pioneers’ who helped make 
this fi rst Digest a reality: Daniel Joyner (University of Alabama), Russell Buchan 
(University of Sheffi  eld), Sten Verhoeven (University of Macau), Raphaël Van 
Steenberghe (Université de Louvain-la-neuve), Kenneth Chan (University of 
Leuven), Patrick Butchard (University of Liverpool) and Ben Murphy (Univer-
sity of Liverpool). 
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Digest Contents
Africa
 — Eastern DRC—Congolese and UN forces fi ght rebel groups—tension with 
Rwanda
 — Congolese troops briefl y detained by Angola
 — Sudan–South Sudan border incidents
 — South Sudan—large-scale violent confl ict erupts between rival factions—third 
states evacuate nationals
 — Chad launches attack on Chadian rebels in Darfur
 — Kenya—Somalia—al-Shabaab attack on Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi
 — Simultaneous US commando operations in Somalia and Libya
 — Ongoing French troop deployment in Mali
 — Ghana claims Ivory Coast sent hit squads to Ghana to kill Gbagbo followers
 — Confl ict rages on in the Central African Republic—French troops operating 
alongside African peacekeepers—regional spillover
Asia
 — Taiwan and Philippines agree on not to use of force against each other’s fi sh-
ing vessels
 — States agree to continue consultation on the Code of Conduct of Parties in the 
South China Sea
 — China announces East China Sea air defence identifi cation zone
 — China–US warship encounter in the South China Sea
 — Tension between India and Pakistan—exchange of fi re along the ‘Line of 
Control’
 — US–Pakistan relations
 — Pakistan protests over cross-border fi ring by Afghan border police
 — Afghanistan–UN Security Council extends ISAF mandate
 — Azerbaijan—Armenia—ongoing violations of the 1994 ceasefi re in and around 
the Nagorno-Karabakh region
Middle East
 — Iran—US stresses that possible use of force is ‘not off  the table’
 — Syrian civil war—Th reats of military strikes against Syria in reaction to the 
use of chemical weapons
 — Syrian civil war—third-state assistance to the warring parties 
 — Syrian Civil War—spillover eff ects 
 — Israel–Lebanon—violations of the ‘Blue Line’ and other incidents
 — Israel—Palestine—incidents in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
 — Yemen—US drone strike—resolution of the Yemen parliament
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Other
 — UN General Assembly urges the international community to ensure that drone 
strikes comply with international law
 — Security Council condemns terrorist attacks / attacks against embassies
I. Africa
Eastern DRC—Congolese and UN forces fight rebel groups—
tension with Rwanda
Following the extension of the mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization 
Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) on 28 March 2013,3 MONUSCO’s ‘Interven-
tion Brigade’, acting alongside the Congolese armed forces, continued off ensive 
operations against rebel groups, in particular against the M23 rebels.4
On various occasions, however, Rwanda was accused of providing aid to Con-
golese rebels. According to the Midterm report of the UN Groups of Experts on 
the DRC, M23 commanders regularly met with Rwandan army offi  cers.5 On 23 
July 2013, US State Department spokeswomen Jen Psaki ‘[called] upon Rwanda 
to immediately end any support to the M23, withdraw military personnel from 
eastern DRC, and follow through on its commitments under the framework’.6 
Allegations of Rwandese support to the M23, while denied by Rwanda,7 were 
fuelled by Rwanda’s obstruction (as a non-permanent Security Council member 
sitting on the Congo sanctions committee) of Security Council sanctions against 
senior M23 commanders.8
3 UNSC Res 2098 (28 March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2098. Th e resolution, adopted under Chapter 
VII UN Charter, authorises the Intervention Brigade to use ‘all necessary means’ inter alia to 
act in a ‘robust, mobile and versatile manner’ to prevent the expansion of all armed groups, to 
neutralize them, and to disarm them (para 12) At the same time, the Resolution emphasises that 
it does not intend to create a ‘precedent’ or to cause ‘any prejudice to the agreed principles of 
peacekeeping’ (para 9). See also UNSC Verbatim Record (28 March 2013) UN Doc S/PV.6943.
4 See eg Kenny Katombe, ‘Congo Army Battles M23 Rebels Near Eastern City of Goma’, Reuters, 
26 August 2013; UNSC ‘Press Statement on Attacks Against United Nations Stabilization Mis-
sion in Democratic Republic of Congo’ (28 October 2013) UN Doc SC/11163
5 ‘Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, annexed 
to UN Doc S/2013/433 (19 July 2013) § 44.
6 US State Department, Daily Press Briefi ng by spokesperson Jen Psaki, 23 July 2013, www.
state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2013/07/212358.htm#GREATLAKESREGION (accessed 12 May 2014). 
See also: ‘US Warns Rwanda Over Support for DRC rebels’, Al Jazeera, 24 July 2013; Lesley 
Wroughton and Christopher Wilson, ‘US Urges Restraint as Fighting Escalates in Eastern 
Congo’, Reuters, 25 August 2013.
7 For example, Richard Lough and Edmund Blair, ‘Rwanda Dismisses US Charges it backs Congo 
Rebels’, Reuters, 30 July 2013.
8 Louis Charbonneau, ‘Rwanda Blocks Proposed UN Sanctions for Two Congo Rebels’, Reuters, 28 
August 2013. Rwanda suggested that sanctions might undermine peace talks between the Con-
golese authorities and the M23 movement.
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In turn, Rwanda in late August 2013 accused Congo of shelling its territory 
and said it would not tolerate such ‘provocation’, raising fears that violence in 
eastern Congo could erupt into a regional confl ict. According to Rwanda’s Min-
ister of Foreign Aff airs: 
Th e persistent shelling of Rwandan territory is unacceptable, as it would be to any 
sovereign nation. Rwandan civilians are being targeted by DRC forces. We have 
remained restrained for as long as we can but this provocation can no longer be tol-
erated. We have the capacity to determine who fi red at us and will not hesitate to 
defend our territory. Rwanda has a responsibility to protect its population.9
Minister Mushikiwabo said the government of Rwanda had repeatedly urged 
the DRC government to stop attacks on its territory but instead violations had 
increased in frequency and intensity: 
Th e shelling by FARDC and FDLR has been a sustained strategy of provocation 
designed to draw Rwanda into the confl ict. Rwanda is the most willing signatory to 
the peace and security framework and we have done everything we can to contribute 
durable peace in the Eastern DRC. But we will not stand by while the army of one 
of the signatories continues to shell civilian targets in Rwanda.10
UN peacekeepers confi rmed fi ring incidents into Rwandan territory originating 
from M23 positions, but reported not having witnessed any Congolese army 
fi ring into Rwandan territory.11 According to the DRC, Rwanda’s accusations 
should be read as a sign that Kigali intended to intervene openly in the con-
fl ict.12 Th e Security Council on 29 August issued a press statement in which the 
Council members ‘expressed concern at reports of repeated mortar shells and 
bombs from Democratic Republic of the Congo territory landing in Rwandan 
territory, and called for a thorough investigation into the sources of these shells 
and bombs by the Expanded Joint Verifi cation Mechanism (EJVM)’.13
Rwanda again accused the DRC of shelling its territory during clashes with 
M23 rebels in late October.14 Rwanda’s UN ambassador reportedly warned the 
other Security Council members in a closed meeting that it would not toler-
ate shelling of its territory and was in a position to respond militarily.15 In 
9 Republic of Rwanda, ‘Shelling of Rwanda by DRC Forces Intensifi es’, Kigali, 29 August 2013, 
www.gov.rw/SHELLING-OF-RWANDA-BY-DRC-FORCES-INTENSIFIES?lang=en (accessed 15 
May 2014).
10 Ibid. According to the Rwandan government, a total of 38 bombs and rockets had been fi red 
into Rwanda late August. See also Nicholas Kulish, ‘Rwanda warns Congo aft er shells hit its ter-
ritory’, New York Times, 29 August 2013.
11 Louis Charbonneau, Michelle Nichols and Philip Barbara, ‘Shelling into Rwanda Came from 
Congo Rebel Areas, UN Says’, Reuters, 29 August 2013.
12 Jenny Clover and Pete Jones, ‘Rwanda Accuses Congo of Shelling as Tensions Mount’, Reuters, 
29 August 2013.
13 UNSC (29 August 2013) Press Release SC/11108.
14 Kenny Katombe, ‘Rebels and Congo Army Clash; Rwanda Says it Was Shelled’, Reuters, 25 Octo-
ber 2013.
15 Ibid.
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a press statement of 25 October, the US State Department expressed concern 
at ‘reports that at least one round landed across the border in Rwanda’ and 
‘urgently [called] on all parties to exercise restraint to prevent military escala-
tion of the confl ict’.16
By the end of 2013, the MONUSCO Intervention Brigade and Congolese 
forces had achieved a military victory over the M23, bringing the M23 to accept 
a peace deal with the government.17 MONUSCO subsequently shift ed its focus 
to battling the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and 
the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). In December 2013, the mission deployed 
unmanned aircraft —a fi rst for UN peacekeeping operations—to monitor the 
border region.18
Congolese troops briefly detained by Angola
On 18 October the Republic of the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville) claimed that 
Angolan troops had crossed into Congolese territory and had encircled and 
detained a group of Congolese soldiers. Angola dismissed the accusations.19 
According to Angola’s foreign minister, Georges Chikoti, ‘Th ere was never any 
incursion [by Angola], there were Congolese troops who got lost in Angolan 
territory, they met our troops and have now been returned to their country.’ 20
Mr Chikoti added that the two countries should keep working together 
to ensure that ‘the border line is visible to everyone so this kind of incident 
doesn’t happen again’.21 A senior Congolese government offi  cial confi rmed that 
the troops were released on 19 October.22
Sudan–South Sudan border incidents
Aft er both sides agreed in March 2013 to set up a border buff er zone and 
resume cross-border oil fl ows in a bid to end hostilities aft er coming close to 
war in April 2012, South Sudan in early July accused Sudan’s army of launching 
16 US State Department, ‘Renewed Fighting in Eastern DRC’, Press Statement, Washington DC, 25 
October 2013, www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/10/215891.htm (accessed 16 May 2014).
17 For example, Michelle Nichols, ‘UN Peacekeepers in Congo Focus on New Armed Groups’, 
Reuters, 6 October 2013; ‘Ban Welcomes Signing of Declarations between DR Congo-M23’, UN 
News Centre, 13 December 2013.
18 ‘UN Forces Introduce Drones in Congo’, Al Jazeera, 4 December 2013.
19 Christian Tsoumou, ‘Angolan Troops Enter Congo Republic, Seize Soldiers – Offi  cer’, Reuters, 18 
October 2013.
20 Shrikesh Laxmidas, Ed Stoddard and Mike Collett-White, ‘Angola Denies Congo Incursion, says 
Lost Troops Entered its Territory’, Reuters, 21 October 2013.
21 Ibid.
22 ‘Angolan Troops Free Seized Congolese Soldiers: Local Offi  cial’, Reuters, 20 October 2013.
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two separate attacks with planes and land troops near their disputed border.23 
According to a spokesman for South Sudan’s army, two Sudanese MiG fi ghters 
had bombed military positions in the disputed Jau area, wounding four soldiers 
and two civilians.24 Sudan denied the allegations and accused South Sudan of 
supporting rebels operating across the shared border—accusations which were 
in turn denied by the latter state.
In a Security Council debate dated 8 July, the representative of South Sudan 
recognised the existence of ongoing tensions between the two countries, yet 
also drew attention to positive signs, such as consultations at the highest politi-
cal level.25
On 11 July, the UN Security Council unanimously passed resolution 
2109(2013), extending the mandate of the UNMISS operation and urging it to 
redeploy to focus on South Sudan’s hot spots. While the Chapter VII resolution 
focused primarily on intra-communal violence within South Sudan (in particu-
lar in the state of Jonglei), the Council also
[condemned] the repeated incidents of cross-border violence between Sudan and 
South Sudan, and [recognised] that the prevailing situation of tension and instability 
in South Sudan’s border area with Sudan and outstanding issues from the Compre-
hensive Peace Agreement have adversely aff ected the security situation, while also 
noting that there has been a reduction in the violence in the border region’26
Later in July, the African Union and IGAD launched the ‘Ad Hoc Investigative 
Mechanism’ (AIM) into allegations by the Republic of Sudan and the Repub-
lic of South Sudan, of continued support to, and harbouring of, armed groups 
operating against the other state.27 While the mechanism was expected to com-
plete its work in six weeks, its report was still outstanding at the end of 2013.
On 5 August 2013, Sudan claimed that one Sudanese was killed in a clash 
with troops from South Sudan aft er a patrol from South Sudan crossed the 
border and opened fi re in the Heglig area.28 Th e spokesperson for Sudan’s army 
added that the situation was ‘brought under control by the commanders of both 
sides’ and had since ‘stabilized’.29
In a Presidential Statement adopted shortly aft er the incident, the Security 
Council expressed grave concern about continued challenges to the implemen-
23 Andrew Green, ‘South Sudan Accuses Sudan of Attacks in Disputed Borderland’, Reuters, 5 July 
2013.
24 Ibid.
25 UNSC Verbatim Record (8 July 2013) UN Doc S/PV.6993, 6.
26 UNSC Res 2109 (11 July 2013), UN Doc S/RES/2109.
27 African Union Press Release, ‘Launch of the Investigative Team on the Relations between Sudan 
and South Sudan’ (22 July 2013) http://au.int/en/sites/default/fi les/auc.com_.aim_.22-07-2013.
pdf (accessed 16 May 2014).
28 Khalid Abdelaziz, Michael Georgy, Eric Beech and Jackie Frank, ‘One Sudanese Soldier Killed 
in Clash with South Sudan’, Reuters, 6 August 2013.
29 ‘Sudan-South Sudan Border Clash Kills One’, AFP, 6 August 2013.
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tation of the 2012 co-operation agreements between Sudan and South Sudan 
and urged the parties to carry them out fully and immediately.30 Th e Council 
among other things recalled that resolution 2046 (2012) prohibited both states 
from supporting any rebel groups operating against the other state, while wel-
coming the establishment of the AU/IGAD AIM.
South Sudan—large-scale violent conflict erupts between rival 
factions—third states evacuate nationals
Heavy fi ghting erupted mid-December 2013 between rival political factions in 
South Sudan as President Salva Kiir accused former Vice-President Riek Machar 
of plotting a coup. In the face of a rapidly deteriorating security and humani-
tarian crisis that left  hundreds of civilians dead and tens of thousands driven 
from their homes, including deadly attacks on a UN base, the Security Council 
authorised UN peacekeeping reinforcements.31 
In consultation with the South Sudanese authorities the United Kingdom 
and the United States sent aircraft  to Juba to evacuate their nationals from the 
country.32 Four US troops were injured when their aircraft  came under ground 
fi re in the course of the evacuation operation.33
30 UNSC Presidential Statement 14 (2013) UN Doc S/PRST/2013/14.
31 UNSC Res 2132 (24 December 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2132. See also: ‘South Sudan: Assailants 
Attack UN Base Sheltering Desperate Civilians’, UN News Centre, 19 December 2013; ‘South 
Sudan: Ban, Security Council Strongly Condemn Deadly Attack on UN Base’, UN News Centre, 
20 December 2013; ‘Security Council Doubles UN Peacekeeping Force in South Sudan in Face 
of Spreading Confl ict’, UN News Centre, 24 December 2013.
32 Evacuation of UK nationals: see eg UK government, ‘UK Aircraft  en Route to South Sudan 
to Evacuate British Nationals’, 19 December 2013: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-
aircraft -en-route-to-south-sudan-to-evacuate-british-nationals (accessed 17 May 2014); ‘UK 
to Airlift  Britons from South Sudan Amid Fighting’, BBC News, 19 December 2013; ‘South 
Sudan: British Plane to Resume Evacuation’, BBC News, 23 December 2013. Evacuation of US 
nationals, see eg US State Department, Press Statement, ‘US Citizen Evacuation in South Sudan’, 
22 December 2013, www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/219057.htm (accessed 17 May 2014); US 
Department of Defense, ‘DOD Aids State Department in South Sudan Evacuation’ (18 Decem-
ber 2013) www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121366 (accessed 17 May 2014); Phil 
Stewart and Missy Ryan, ‘US Moves Marines to Africa as South Sudan Violence Rages’, Reuters, 
23 December 2013.
33 US Department of Defense, ‘Ground Fire Injures 4 US Troops in South Sudan’, 21 December 
2013: www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121382& (accessed 17 May 2014). Th e aircraft  
was allegedly attacked when approaching Bor, a city occupied by forces loyal to former Vice-
President Machar. See also: ‘South Sudan Evacuation Aircraft  Fired On, US Troops Hurt’, BBC 
News, 21 December 2013.
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Chad launches attack on Chadian rebels in Darfur
In November 2013, Chad reportedly launched a helicopter attack on Chadian 
rebels in Darfur, Sudan, and sent a military convoy to the region.34 Although 
the relations between Chad and Sudan had previously been strained, ties had 
since been strengthened. Th ere was speculation that the Chadian soldiers were 
deployed in support of Sudan’s overall military plan to end the rebellion in 
Darfur. Offi  cials declined to comment.
Kenya—Somalia—al-Shabaab attack on Westgate shopping mall 
in Nairobi
On 21 September 2013, unidentifi ed gunmen attacked the Westgate shopping 
mall in Nairobi, Kenya. Th e attack, which lasted until 24 September, resulted 
in at least 67 deaths, including several attackers.35 Responsibility for the attack 
was claimed by the Somali Islamist group al-Shabaab, which characterised it as 
retribution for Kenya’s military deployment in Somalia (in particular in the con-
text of ‘Operation Linda Nchi’ (2011–12)36). Th e attack was widely condemned, 
including by the UN Envoy for Somalia Nicholas Kay, who stressed that the 
5,000 militants of al-Shabaab posed an international threat.37 Th e Somali prime 
minister stated that Somalia was working closely with the Kenyan authorities 
and called for international support to combat al-Shabaab.38
In the wake of the attack, Kenya declared that it was ‘at war’ with al-
Shabaab,39 and cautioned Somalia to ‘put its house in order’.40 In reaction to 
repeated warnings of al-Shabaab to Kenya that new attacks would follow if it 
did not pull its troops from Somalia, Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta stated 
Kenya would stay until ‘they bring order in their nation’.41
34 Madjiasra Nako, Emma Farge and Toby Chopra, ‘Chad Starts Military Campaign Against Rebels 
in Darfur’, Reuters, 16 November 2013.
35 For example ‘Somalia’s al-Shabab Claims Nairobi Westgate Kenya Attack’, BBC News, 22 Septem-
ber 2013.
36 On 17 October 2011, Kenya informed the Security Council that ‘with the concurrence of the 
Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, [it had] been compelled to take robust, targeted 
measures to protect and preserve the integrity of Kenya  … in the face of the Al-Shabaab ter-
rorist militia attacks emanating from Somali’. Letter dated 17 October 2011 from the Permanent 
Representative of Kenya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Coun-
cil (18 October 2011) UN Doc S/2011/646.
37 Stephanie Nebehay and Tom Miles, ‘UN Envoy for Somalia Seeks More Resources to Combat 
al Shabaab’, Reuters, 24 September 2013.
38 Tom Miles, Stephanie Nebehay and Mike Collett-White, ‘Somali Prime Minister Calls for Aid 
to Combat al Shabaab’, Reuters, 24 September 2013.
39 Matthew Mpoke Bigg and James Macharia, ‘Kenya Says “At War” with al Shabaab, Faces Secu-
rity Questions’, Reuters, 28 September 2013.
40 Richard Lough and James Macharia, ‘Kenya Tells Somalia “Put House in Order” aft er Mall 
Attack’, Reuters, 1 October 2013.
41 Ibid.
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On 31 October, the Kenyan military announced that its warplanes had 
bombed al-Shabaab targets in Somalia in retaliation for the Westgate mall attack, 
allegedly resulting in the destruction of an al-Shabaab training camp, and that 
it had conducted a drone strike killing two al-Shabaab leaders.42 According to 
a spokesman for the Kenyan military, ‘Th is was part of a broader mission by 
the AMISOM [the UN-backed African peacekeeping mission in Somalia].’43 Al-
Shabaab denied that there had been any attack.44
Simultaneous US commando operations in Somalia and Libya
On 6 October 2013, US special forces carried out separate operations in Libya 
and Somalia.45 Th e former raid resulted in the capture of Abu Anas al-Liby, sus-
pected of being involved in the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi 
and Dar Es Salaam. Th e latter operation, aimed against a leader of al-Shabaab 
(responsible for the large-scale attack on a shopping mall in Kenya one week 
earlier—see above), ultimately proved unsuccessful, as US special forces were 
forced to retreat aft er encountering fi erce resistance from al-Shabaab fi ghters.
Although the United States did not put forward a formal legal justifi ca-
tion for the operations,46 during two press briefi ngs dated 7 and 11 October, 
respectively,47 a spokesperson of the State Department suggested that the US 
had not violated the sovereignty of Libya and stressed that the US ‘consulted 
regularly’ with the Libyan government ‘on a range of security and counterter-
rorism issues’. Reference was made to the Authorization for the Use of Military 




45 See Kevin Rawlinson, ‘US Special Forces Raids Target Islamist Militants in Libya and Soma-
lia’, Th e Guardian, 6 October 2013; ‘Libya Demands US Return al-Qaeda Suspect’, Al Jazeera, 
9 October 2013; Chris Stephen, Abdalle Ahmed and David Smith, ‘Libya Demands Explana-
tion for US “Kidnapping” of Al-Qaida Leader al-Liby’, Th e Guardian, 7 October 2013; Nicholas 
Kulish, Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti, ‘Target in US Raid on Somalia is Called Top Shabab 
Planner of Attacks Abroad’, New York Times, 6 October 2013; ‘US Commando Raids Target 
Islamist Leaders in Africa’, BBC News, 6 October 2013.
46 Secretary of State John Kerry expressed the hope that the operations made ‘clear that [the US] 
will never stop in its eff ort to hold those accountable who conduct acts of terror’, US State 
Department, Remarks of Secretary of State John Kerry (6 October 2013) www.state.gov/secre-
tary/remarks/2013/10/215160.htm (accessed 18 May 2014). For a similar general statement, see: 
US Department of Defense, Statement by Secretary Hagel on Operations in Libya and Soma-
lia (6 October 2013) Release No 701-13 www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=16295 
(accessed 18 May 2014).
47 US Department of State, Daily Press Briefi ng, 7 October 2013, www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
dpb/2013/10/215183.htm (accessed 18 May 2014); US Department of State, Daily Press Brief-
ing, 10 October 2013, www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2013/10/215296.htm#LIBYA (accessed 18 
May 2014).
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Force of 2001 under US domestic law as well as to the applicability of the law 
of armed confl ict.
In a statement on the operation in Somalia, Pentagon Press Secretary George 
Little suggested that the operation was approved by the Somali authorities.48 
When asked whether Somalia had been aware of the raid, the Somali prime 
minister, Abdi Farah Shirdon, responded that ‘[o]ur co-operation with interna-
tional partners on fi ghting against terrorism is not a secret’.49 Somalia eff ectively 
welcomed the operation: ‘We have close cooperation with the world, especially 
the western countries in the fi ght against al-Shabaab. … We welcome any opera-
tion to hunt the terrorist leaders. … Al-Shabaab is a Somali problem, a regional 
problem and world problem.’50
Amidst suggestions of senior US offi  cials that it had tacitly approved the 
capture of al-Liby,51 the Libyan government refused to say whether it had been 
informed of the operation in advance. Prime Minister Ali Zaidan stated that 
‘Th e Libyan government is following the news of the kidnapping of a Libyan 
citizen who is wanted by US authorities. Th e Libyan government has contacted 
US authorities to ask them to provide an explanation.’52 Th e Libyan National 
Congress for its part adopted a statement describing the US operation as a ‘fl a-
grant violation of [Libya’s] national sovereignty’.53 
Th ree weeks later, a suspected US drone strike killed at least two al-Shabaab 
fi ghters travelling in Somalia.54 No responsibility was claimed for the strike.
Ongoing French troop deployment in Mali
Th roughout the second semester of 2013, French troops, participating in ‘Opé-
ration Serval’, continued to operate alongside MINUSMA peacekeepers, with 
a view to assisting the government of Mali to battle terrorist groups operating 
within its territory.55
48 US Department of Defense, Statement by Pentagon Press Secretary George Little on US oper-
ations in Somalia, Release No. 703-13 (7 October 2013) www.defense.gov/releases/release.
aspx?releaseid=16297 (accessed 18 May 2014).
49 ‘US Commando Raids: Libya Demands Explanation’, BBC News, 7 October 2013.
50 Quoted in Stephen et al (n 45).
51 Michael S Schmidt and Eric Schmitt, ‘US Offi  cials Say Libya Approved Commando Raids’, New 
York Times, 9 October 2013.
52 Quoted in Stephen et al (n 45).
53 See ‘Libya Demands US Return al-Qaeda Suspect’, Al Jazeera, 9 October 2013.
54 Feisal Omar, James Macharia and Ralph Boulton, ‘Drone Strike Kills at Least Two in Somalia—
Residents’, Reuters, 28 October 2013.
55 See in particular UNSC Res 2085 (20 December 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2085; UNSC Res 2100 
(25 April 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2100. In a letter dated 2 October 2013 (Letter dated 2 Octo-
ber 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Mali to the United Nations addressed to the 
Secretary-General, UN Doc S/2013/586), Mali ‘urges[d] the entire international community to 
remain actively engaged in support of Mali’s counter-terrorism eff orts’. In November 2013, al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb claimed responsibility for the killing of two French journalists 
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Asked if French soldiers should be allowed to cross borders to pursue mili-
tants leaving Mali, French army chief Edouard Guillaud in a radio interview 
responded as follows: ‘I think we should hunt them down everywhere. Th at’s 
why we are working with our neighbors Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad, and 
also cooperating with Algeria so that there is no sanctuary for them.’56 Late 
2013, France announced a partial withdrawal of its troops from Mali by the 
end of January 2014.57
Ghana claims Ivory Coast sent hit squads to Ghana to kill 
Gbagbo followers
Ghana told a UN panel in July 2013 that Ivory Coast had sent hit squads 
to abduct or kill exiled supporters of former Ivory Coast President Laurent 
Gbagbo (currently awaiting trial before the International Criminal Court).58 
Ghana claimed to have foiled at least two such missions. Th e accusations were 
dismissed by the Ivorian government and could not be independently verifi ed. 
Th e Ivorian government and UN investigators have accused exiled Gbagbo fol-
lowers of continuing to orchestrate violence inside Ivory Coast. 
Conflict rages on in the Central African Republic—French 
troops operating alongside African peacekeepers—regional 
spillover
Th e sectarian war between the Séléka Muslim militias and government forces 
and Anti-balaka Christian militias, which broke out in late 2012, raged on in 
the Central African Republic (CAR). As violence intensifi ed, with hundreds 
of civilians being massacred, the UN Security Council on 5 December 2013 
authorised the African-led International Support Mission to the CAR (MISCA) 
and French troops present in the country to use force to protect civilians.59 Th e 
in northern Mali in retribution for France’s military involvement in Mali. See Laurent Prieur, 
Daniel Flynn, David Lewis and Kevin Liff ey, ‘Al Qaeda Claims Killing of French Journalists in 
Mali: Report’, Reuters, 6 November 2013.
 
56 John Irish, ‘French Troops Should Hunt Qaeda Beyond Mali Borders: Army Chief ’, Reuters, 14 
November 2013.
57 ‘France Prepares to Withdraw Mali troops’, Al Jazeera, 25 December 2013.
58 Joe Bavier, ‘Ghana says Ivory Coast Sent Agents to Kill Exiles: UN’, Reuters, 2 December 2013; 
‘Ivory Coast Targets Gbagbo Followers in Ghana’, Al Jazeera, 2 December 2013.
59 UNSC Res 2127 (5 December 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2127. See also UNSC Res 2121 (10 Octo-
ber 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2121; UN Secretary-General, ‘Concerned Over Grave Situation in 
Central African Republic, Secretary-General Calls for Urgent Action to Deploy African, French 
Forces’ (2013) UN Doc SG/SM/15522; ‘Central African Republic  : Security Council Approves 
New Peacekeeping Force’, UN News Centre, 5 December 2013; Michelle Nichols and Louis 
Charbonneau, ‘UN Authorizes French, African Troops in Central African Republic’, Reuters, 
5 December 2013; Elysée, ‘Déclaration à l’issue du Conseil restreint de défense sur la situation 
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Security Council moreover welcomed eff orts to transform MISCA into a UN 
peacekeeping operation.
Meanwhile, there were also reports of spillover eff ects into neighbouring 
countries. On 17 November, for instance, Cameroon declared that its army had 
repelled a raid against a village in eastern Cameroon by gunmen from the CAR.60
II. Asia
Taiwan and Philippines agree on not to use of force against 
each other’s fishing vessels
Following the Guang Da Xing No 28 shooting incident, in which a Taiwanese 
fi sherman was killed when a Philippine coastguard vessel fi red on a Taiwanese 
fi shing boat in overlapping exclusive economic waters, Taiwan and the Philip-
pines in June 2013 agreed that law enforcement vessels from each side would 
not use armed force or violence against fi shing boats of the other side. Th e two 
sides moreover agreed
to establish means for notifying each other without delay whenever hot pursuit, 
boarding, inspection, arrest, detention, or judicial proceedings are carried out against 
vessels and crews of either side pursuant to the enforcement of their respective fi sher-
ies laws and relevant regulations, consistent with international practice.61
Th e agreement was reaffi  rmed during a meeting of the two parties in August 
2013.62
en République centrafricaine’ (5 December 2013) www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-
a-l-issue-du-conseil-restreint-de-defense-sur-la-situation-en-republique-centrafricaine/ (accessed 
20 May 2014); Emmanuel Braun and Paul-Marin Ngoupana, ‘France to Start Disarming Central 
African Republic Fighters on Monday’, Reuters, 8 December 2013.
 
60 Tansa Musa, Matthew Mpoke Bigg and Jackie Frank, ‘Cameroon says Army Repulses Attack 
from Central African Republic’, Reuters, 17 November 2013; ‘Cameroon ‘Repels Attack’ from 
Central African Republic’, BBC News, 18 November 2013.
61 Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, Republic of China (Taiwan), ‘1st preparatory meet-
ing on ROC–Philippines fi sheries cooperation yields concrete results, with both sides 
guaranteeing avoidance of the use of force to prevent recurrence of incidents such 
as that involving the Guang Da Xing No 28’ (15 June 2013) Press Release No 162, 
www.mofa.gov.tw/EnOfficial/ArticleDetail/DetailDefault/a2ecdc04-286c-43e0-b402-
9c81d14b0f99?arfid=7b3b4d7a-8ee7-43a9-97f8-7f3d313ad781&opno=84ba3639-be42-4966-
b873-78a267de8cf1 (accessed 20 May 2014).
62 Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, Republic of China (Taiwan), ‘Following the constructive response 
of the Philippine government to the shooting incident involving the Taiwan fi shing boat Guang 
Da Xing No 28, the government of the Republic of China announces that cooperative and 
friendly relations between the two countries are being restored, eff ective immediately’ (8 August 
2013) Press Release No 202 www.mofa.gov.tw/EnPDA/News/Detail/eb8081fd-8616-4263-8b96-
f443c63b3294?arfi d=7b3b4d7a-8ee7-43a9-97f8-7f3d313ad781 (accessed 20 May 2014). See also 
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States agree to continue consultation on the Code of Conduct 
of Parties in the South China Sea
During a meeting on 14–15 September 2013, senior offi  cials of ASEAN Member 
States and China agreed to continue offi  cial consultations on the 2002 Declara-
tion of Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, and make regular 
reports to foreign ministers.63 During the meeting, the Philippines expressed 
its position that the Code of Conduct should be legally binding and called for 
respect for the principles enshrined therein, in particular for the non-use of 
force.
China announces East China Sea air defence identification zone
Th e People’s Republic of China announced the installation of an air defence 
identifi cation zone (ADIZ), encompassing a substantial part of the East China 
Sea, eff ective as from 23 November 2013. According to a statement issued by 
the National Ministry of Defense, aircraft  fl ying through the ADIZ are required, 
inter alia, to report fl ight plans to the Chinese authorities; to maintain two-way 
radio communications, and respond in a timely and accurate manner to iden-
tifi cation inquiries, and; to follow the instructions of the Chinese authorities.64 
According to the statement, ‘China’s armed forces will adopt defensive emer-
gency measures to respond to aircraft  that do not cooperate in the identifi cation 
or refuse to follow the instructions.’65
Th e Chinese ADIZ overlaps with a previously established Japanese ADIZ, 
as well as (to lesser extent) South Korean and Taiwanese ADIZ, and includes 
contested maritime areas and islands, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
(disputed between China and Japan) and the Socotra Rock/Suyan Jiao (disputed 
between China and South Korea). Its creation evoked strong reactions from 
several regional players.
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stated that the Chinese measures ‘have 
no validity whatsoever on Japan, and we demand China revoke any measures 
that could infringe upon the freedom of fl ight in international airspace’.66  Foreign 
eg Mainland Aff airs Council, Republic of China (Taiwan), ‘President Ma attends 2013 East 
China Sea Peace Forum’ (5 August 2013) www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=105925&ctNode=590
9&mp=3 (accessed 20 May 2014).
 
63 Philippine Information Agency, ‘ASEAN, China Launch Offi  cial Consultations on Code 
of Conduct in South China Sea’ (17 September 2013) http://news.pia.gov.ph/index.
php?article=1551379325658 (accessed 20 May 2014).
64 PRC Ministry of National Defense, ‘Announcement of the Aircraft  Identifi cation Rules for the 
East China Sea Air Defense Identifi cation Zone of the PRC’ (23 November 2013) http://eng.
mod.gov.cn/Press/2013-11/23/content_4476143.htm (accessed 20 May 2014).
65 Ibid.
66 John Hofi lena, ‘Japan PM Abe Demands that China Revoke Claim to Airspace Over Disputed 
Lands’, Japan Daily Press, 26 November 2013.
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Minister Kishida issued a statement stressing that the measures announced by 
the PRC ‘unduly infringe the freedom of fl ight in international airspace, which 
is the general principle of international law, and will have serious impacts on 
the order of international aviation’.67 Noting that Japan was working closely with 
the US and would co-ordinate with other states in the region, the Japanese 
foreign minister asserted that his country would ‘continue to respond fi rmly 
but in a calm manner against China’s attempt to unilaterally alter the status 
quo by coercive measures with determination to defend resolutely its territorial 
land, sea and airspace’.68 Japanese Defence Minister Onodera stressed that it was 
‘important for both sides to take a calm approach and deal with the situation 
according to international norms’.69
South Korea summoned a Chinese diplomat to protest against the Chinese 
move70 and announced a substantial expansion of its own air defence identifi -
cation zone, to include a submerged rock disputed between the two countries.71 
Th ere was no immediate response from Beijing or Tokyo.
US Secretary of State John Kerry expressed his ‘deep concern’ about China’s 
decision to establish the East China sea ADIZ: 
Th is unilateral action constitutes an attempt to change the status quo in the East 
China Sea. Escalatory action will only increase tensions in the region and create risks 
of an incident. Freedom of overfl ight and other internationally lawful uses of sea and 
airspace are essential to prosperity, stability, and security in the Pacifi c. We don’t sup-
port eff orts by any state to apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft  not intending 
to enter its national airspace. Th e United States does not apply its ADIZ procedures 
to foreign aircraft  not intending to enter US national airspace. We urge China not to 
implement its threat to take action against aircraft  that do not identify themselves or 
obey orders from Beijing.72
US Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel expressed similar concern, while also 
stressing that ‘[t]his announcement by the [PRC] will not in any way change 
67 Ministry of Foreign Aff airs of Japan, ‘Statement by the Minister for Foreign Aff airs on the 
Announcement on the ‘East China Sea Air Defence Identifi cation Zone’ by the Ministry of 
National Defense of the People’s Republic of China’ (24 November 2013) www.mofa.go.jp/press/
release/press4e_000098.html (accessed 20 May 2014).
68 Ibid.
69 Quoted in ‘East China Sea Tensions Prompt Caution from US Airlines’, CBC News, 30 Novem-
ber 2013.
70 ‘China Hit with Complaints over Maritime Air Defense Zone’, Voice of America, 25 November 
2013.
71 Choe Sang-Hun, ‘South Korea Announces Expansion of its Air Defense Zone’, New York Times, 
8 December 2013; ‘South Korea Declares Expanded ADIZ Overlapping with Other Zones’, Japan 
Times, 8 December 2013.
72 United States Department of State, ‘Statement on the East China Sea Air Defense Identifi cation 
Zone’ (23 November 2013) www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/11/218013.htm (accessed 20 
May 2014).
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how the United States conducts military operations in the region’.73 Secretary 
Hagel moreover ‘reaffi  rmed’ the United States’ ‘longstanding policy that Arti-
cle V of the US–Japan Mutual Defense Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands’.74 
Vice-President Biden reiterated US concerns about the Chinese ADIZ during a 
visit to China early December.75
Th e United States, Japan and South Korea each defi ed the Chinese ADIZ 
by fl ying military aircraft  through the zone without informing Beijing.76 China 
claimed that it had monitored the fl ights concerned, without undertaking fur-
ther action. 
In a move that was condemned by the PRC as putting the security of Jap-
anese citizens at risk,77 two major Japanese airlines agreed with the Japanese 
government that they would continue fl ying through the zone without noti-
fying China.78 In a similar vein, the South Korean Ministry of Transport said 
that Korean aircraft  fl ying through China’s ADIZ should not submit their 
fl ight plans to China, since South Korea did not recognise the zone.79 By con-
trast, the United States advised US commercial airlines to comply with China’s 
instructions to avoid unintended confrontations.80 Th e United States nonethe-
less emphasised that this position in no way indicated its acceptance of China’s 
requirements for operating in the newly declared ADIZ.81
Several other players voiced concern with regard to the Chinese ADIZ. Aus-
tralian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, for instance, stated that:
73 United States Department of Defense, ‘Statement by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on the 
East China Sea Air Defense Identifi cation Zone’, Release No NR-036-13 (23 November 2013) 
www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=16392 (accessed 20 May 2014).
74 Ibid.
75 See eg United States White House, ‘Remarks by the Vice President at a Breakfast with the 
American Chamber of Commerce in Beijing and the US–China Business Council’ (5 December 
2013) www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-offi  ce/2013/12/05/remarks-vice-president-breakfast-ameri-
can-chamber-commerce-beijing-and-u (accessed 20 May 2014).
76 See eg ‘China Says US Bombers Flew Over its Defence Zone’, CBC News, 27 November 2013; 
‘China Monitors US Bombers in Defense Zone’, Xinhua News, 27 November 2013; Craig Whit-
lock, ‘US Flies Two Warplanes over East China Sea, Ignoring New Chinese Air Defense Zone’, 
Washington Post, 26 November 2013; Simon Denyer and Chico Harlan, ‘China Sends Warplanes 
to New Air Defense Zone aft er US, Japan, S Korea Incursions’, Washington Post, 28 November 
2013.
77 ‘Japan Must See Air Zone Is about Safety: Experts’ (30 November 2013) http://eng.mod.gov.cn/
TopNews/2013-11/30/content_4477157.htm (accessed 20 May 2014).
78 ‘East China Sea Tensions Prompt Caution from US Airlines’, CBC News, 30 November 2013. 
Japan also asked the International Civil Aviation Organization to assess whether the Chinese 
ADIZ could endanger civilian fl ights. See Ministry of Foreign Aff airs of Japan, ‘200th Session 
of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)’ (30 November 2013) 
www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_000114.html (accessed 20 May 2014).
79 ‘Seoul Considers Southward Expansion of Air Defense Zone’, Korea Herald, 1 December 2013.
80 United States Department of State, Offi  ce of the Spokesperson, ‘China’s Declared ADIZ—Guid-
ance for US Air Carriers’ (29 November 2013) www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/11/218139.htm 
(accessed 20 May 2014). 
81 Ibid. See also: Yuka Hayashi and Andy Pasztor, ‘Japan, US at Odds over China’s Air Zone’, Wall 
Street Journal, 1 December 2013.
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Th e timing and the manner of China’s announcement are unhelpful in light of cur-
rent regional tensions, and will not contribute to regional stability. Australia has made 
clear its opposition to any coercive or unilateral actions to change the status quo in 
the East China Sea.82
A spokesman of the Department of Foreign Aff airs of the Philippines declared 
that: ‘China’s East Asia Sea ADIZ transforms the entire airzone into its domes-
tic airspace, infringes on the right to freedom of fl ight in international airspace 
and compromises the safety of civil aviation and national security of aff ected 
states.’83 Furthermore, following the adoption of a non-binding resolution in 
which the legislature’s caucus leaders urged him to lodge an offi  cial protest with 
China over the creation of the East China Sea ADIZ,84 Taiwanese President Ma 
Ying-jeou emphasized the need to restore harmony to the region and to pursue 
peaceful negotiations to this end.85 Th e European Union similarly expressed 
concern that the creation of the Chinese ADIZ heightened the risk of escala-
tion and contributed to raising tensions in the region.86
In reaction to criticism of its conduct, China suggested third states adopted 
‘double standards’.87 Asked if China would or would not rule out the recourse 
to armed force vis-à-vis aircraft  not complying with the ADIZ instructions, a 
spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that ‘China [would] take 
corresponding action in accordance with the situation and the level of threat 
that it may face’.88 On 3 December, Geng Yansheng, spokesman of the PRC 
Ministry of National Defence made the following statement:89 
82 Australian Minister for Foreign Aff airs, ‘China’s Announcement of an Air-Defence Identifi ca-
tion Zone OVER the East China Sea’ (26 November 2013) http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/
Pages/2013/jb_mr_131126a.aspx?ministerid=4 (accessed 20 May 2014).
83 Quoted in Louis Bacani, ‘DFA: China’s New Air Defense Zone Unsafe, Th reatens Flight Free-
dom’, Philippine Star, 28 November 2013.
84 Chris Wang and Shih Hsiu-chuan, ‘Resolution Urges Air Zone Protest’, Taipei Times, 30 Novem-
ber 2013.
85 ‘Taiwan Wades into East China Sea Air Defence Zone Debate’, Australia Network News, 2 
December 2013.
86 EU ‘Declaration by the High Representative Catherine Ashton on behalf of the European Union 
on the Establishment by China of an “East China Sea Air Defence Identifi cation Zone”’ (28 
November 2013) Doc 17082/1/13/REV 1, www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/
pressdata/EN/foraff /139752.pdf (accessed 20 May 2014).
87 See eg Alex Spillius, ‘China Scrambles Jets Aft er US and Japan Enter Air Zone’, Th e Telegraph, 
29 November 2013; Wu Liming, ‘Commentary: US, Japan Wrong to Blame China for Air Zone’, 
Xinhua News, 26 November 2013; Wu Liming, ‘Commentary: US, Japan’s Logic on Air Zone 
Ridiculous’, Xinhua News, 25 November 2013.
88 ‘Defense Ministry Spokesman Yang Yjun’s Response to Questions of ADIZ at Regular Press 
Conference’ (28 November 2013) www.chinamission.be/eng/zt/zbzc/t1109759.htm (accessed 20 
May 2014).
89 ‘Defense Ministry Spokesman on China’s Air Defense Identifi cation Zone’, Xinhua News, 3 
December 2013.
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Th e [ADIZ] is a necessary measure for China to protect its state sovereignty and 
territorial and airspace security. It is conducive to maintaining fl ying safety in inter-
national airspace, and is in line with international laws and conventions. …
 Some people take the ADIZ to be a territorial airspace by falsely saying that China 
violates other countries’ interests; some equate the ADIZ with a no-fl y zone, accusing 
China of severely undermining the freedom of overfl ight. Both statements are incor-
rect. An ADIZ is essentially diff erent from territorial airspace or no-fl y zones. It is 
not a country’s territorial airspace, but an international airspace demarcated outside 
the territorial airspace for the purpose of identifi cation and early warning; it is not a 
no-fl y zone, and will not aff ect the freedom of overfl ight, based on international laws, 
of other countries’ aircraft . According to international practice, a country can iden-
tify and verify aircraft  entering its ADIZ. China’s ADIZ was established to set aside 
enough time for early warning to defend the country’s airspace, with defense acting 
as the key point. Th e zone does not aim at any specifi c country or target, nor does 
it constitute a threat to any country or region.
 … Th e Chinese military’s determination and volition to safeguard the security 
of national territory and territorial airspace are unwavering, and the military is 
fully capable of exercising eff ective control over the East China Sea ADIZ. Gener-
ally, supervision and control are exercised through reported fl ight plans and radar 
response and identifi cation, among other means. Military planes can also take fl ight if 
necessary to identify entering targets. Measures to be taken are based on factors such 
as an entering aircraft ’s attributes—military or civilian, the extent of threat, or dis-
tance. Fighter planes are unnecessary when an entering aircraft  is found to pose no 
threat to us, but necessary surveillance is needed; when the entering threat is ascer-
tained to reach a certain extent, military aircraft  will be mobilized at an appropriate 
time to dispose of the situation. It is well-known that civil fl ights pose no threat 
in most circumstances. China always respects other countries’ freedom of overfl ight 
according to international laws, so that international fl ights that fl y normally within 
the rules in the East China Sea ADIZ will not be aff ected …
 China unswervingly adheres to the road of peaceful development and a defensive 
national defense policy. … We are willing to conduct active communication and con-
sultation with relevant parties to jointly safeguard fl ight safety and promote peace, 
stability and development in the Asia-Pacifi c region.
China–US warship encounter in the South China Sea
A Chinese and a US naval vessel came close to colliding in the South China 
Sea on 5 December 2013, when a Chinese warship cut across the bow of a US 
cruiser, the USS Cowpens, forcing the ship to undertake evasive action.90 At the 
time of the incident, the Cowpens was engaged in surveillance of the Liaoning, 
the new aircraft  carrier of the People’s Republic of China, as it made its fi rst 
90 Tom Shanker, ‘Hagel Criticizes Chinese Navy, Citing Near Miss’, New York Times, 19 December 
2013.
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voyage in the South China Sea. One expert described the events as the most 
signifi cant US–China maritime incident in the South China Sea since 2009.91 
Th e Chinese Ministry of Defence downplayed the incident, stressing that the 
two ships had communicated eff ectively and that the Chinese warship ‘handled 
the situation strictly according to relevant operation specifi cations’.92 Later in 
December, however, US Defence Secretary Chuch Hagel called the actions of 
the Chinese Navy ‘irresponsible’, warning that a near collision ‘could be a trig-
ger or a spark that could set off  some eventual miscalculation’.93
Tension between India and Pakistan—exchange of fire along the 
‘Line of Control’
India, on 6 August 2013, stated that a group of militants from Pakistan had 
killed fi ve of its soldiers in an ambush along the disputed border in Kashmir, 
in an accusation that threatened to derail eff orts to resume peace talks. Paki-
stan rejected the allegation and affi  rmed its commitment to the ceasefi re.94 Two 
Pakistani soldiers were wounded the next day in an exchange of fi re with Indian 
troops along the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir.95 A Pakistani military offi  -
cial spoke of ‘unprovoked Indian fi ring’. A senior Indian army offi  cer conversely 
suggested that Pakistani troops had opened fi re and Indian forces had retali-
ated. On 8 August, Indian Defence Minister Antony openly claimed that troops 
of the Pakistan army had been involved in the ambush two days earlier.96 In 
another incident, Pakistan accused Indian forces of having resorted to unpro-
voked fi ring at the LoC, wounding a Pakistani civilian.97 Another exchange of 
fi re occurred on 11 August 2013.98
Tension along the LoC continued in subsequent weeks and months. While 
India repeatedly accused Pakistan of violating the LoC, the Pakistani Minis-
try of Foreign Aff airs on 23 October 2013 published a press release stating as 
follows:
91 David Alexander and Pete Sweeney, ‘US, Chinese Warships Narrowly Avoid Collision in South 
China Sea’, Reuters, 14 December 2013.
92 PRC Ministry of National Defense, ‘China, US Communicate Eff ectively over Warship 
Encounter: Ministry’ (18 December 2013) http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2013-12/18/con-
tent_4479365.htm (accessed 20 May 2014).
93 Quoted in Shanker (n 90).
94 Fayaz Bukhari, ‘India–Pakistan Talks in Jeopardy as Indian Soldiers Killed’, Reuters, 6 August 
2013.
95 Katharine Houreld, ‘Pakistani Soldiers Wounded in New Kashmir Confrontation with India’, 
Reuters, 7 August 2013.
96 Ross Colvin, ‘India Accuses Pakistan Army of killing Soldiers in Ambush’, Reuters, 8 August 
2013.
97 Katharine Houreld and Maria Golovnina, ‘Pakistan Army Says Civilian Wounded by Indian Fire 
on Kashmir Border’, Reuters, 8 August 2013.
98 Ashok Pahalwan, ‘India, Pakistan Exchange more Gunfi re, Ceasefi re under Strain’, Reuters, 11 
August 2013.
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During the last two days, Indian troops have intensifi ed violations and have carried 
out unprovoked fi ring. … Th e indiscriminate shelling on civilian population and tar-
geting of 27 Pakistani posts has resulted in casualty of two civilians and one security 
personnel and serious injuries to 26 civilians. Th e Indian Border Security Force has 
fi red almost 4,000 mortar shells and 59,000 rounds of machine gun fi res, escalating 
tension across LoC and the working boundary. Th e Pakistani security forces exercised 
restraint and gave a measured and calibrated response to the unprovoked Indian 
aggression.99
US–Pakistan relations
Pakistan protests against repeated drone strikes
Th roughout the second half of 2013, the Pakistani government repeatedly pro-
tested against US drone strikes carried out within its territory. Th us, when on 3 
July a US drone strike killed at least 17 people aft er two missiles struck a house 
near the main market in Miranshah,100 the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Aff airs 
issued the following statement: 
Th e Government of Pakistan strongly condemns the US drone strike that took place 
in Miranshah, North Waziristan on 03 July 2013. Th ese strikes are a violation of 
Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Pakistan has repeatedly emphasized the 
importance of bringing an immediate end to drone strikes. Th e Government of Paki-
stan has consistently maintained that drone strikes are counter-productive, entail loss 
of innocent civilian lives and have human rights and humanitarian implications.’101 
Similar statements were made in relation to numerous other drone strikes.102 
Pakistan repeatedly raised its objections to the drone strikes in contacts with 
99 Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, ‘Pakistan’s Response to Unprovoked Firing by India’ 
(Islamabad, 23 October 2013) www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=1500 (accessed 21 May 
2014).
100 Jibran Ahmad, ‘Drone Attack Kills 17 in Pakistan’s Waziristan Region’, Reuters, 3 July 2013. Res-
cuers were allegedly hesitant to help the wounded and injured for fear of a second attack.
101 Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, ‘Pakistan Protests against Drone Strikes in Miranshah’ 
(Islamabad, 3 July 2013) www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=1296 (accessed 21 May 2014).
102 For example, Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, ‘Pakistan Protests against the Drone Strike 
in Mir Ali’ (Islamabad, 15 July 2013) www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=1320 (accessed 
21 May 2014); ‘Pakistan Condemns the US Drone Strike in Shawal Area’ (Islamabad, 29 July 
2013) www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=1342 (accessed 21 May 2014); ‘Pakistan Condemns 
US Drone Strike’ (Islamabad, 6 September 2013) www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=1415 
(accessed 21 May 2014); ‘Pakistan Condemns the US Drone Strike in South Waziristan’ (Islam-
abad, 22 September 2013) www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=1442 (accessed 21 May 2014); 
‘Pakistan Condemns the US Drone Strike Near Miranshah’ (Islamabad, 29 September 2013) 
www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=1483 (accessed 21 May 2014); ‘Pakistan Condemns the 
US Drone Strike in North Waziristan’ (Islamabad, 30 September 2013) www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-
details.php?prID=1484 (accessed 21 May 2014); ‘Pakistan Condemns the US Drone Strike in 
Miranshah’ (Islamabad, 31 October 2013) www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=1513 (accessed 
21 May 2014); ‘Pakistan Condemns the US Drone Strike in North Waziristan’ (Islamabad, 1 
November 2013) www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=1517 (accessed 21 May 2014); ‘Pakistan 
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US offi  cials,103 as well as before the UN Security Council104 and before the UN 
General Assembly.105
On 10 December 2013, the Pakistani Parliament condemned the drone 
attacks on its territory as a ‘violation of the principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations, international laws and humanitarian norms’106
At the same time, top-secret CIA documents and Pakistani diplomatic memos 
obtained by the Washington Post reportedly indicated that top offi  cials in Paki-
stan’s government had for years secretly endorsed the CIA’s drone programme 
and had routinely received classifi ed briefi ngs on strikes and casualty counts.107
Pakistani Commission concludes that the bin Laden killing was an act 
of war in clear violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity
Th e fi nal report of Pakistan’s Abbottabad Commission, set up to probe the raid 
and previous eff orts to capture Osama bin Laden, was leaked by Al Jazeera in 
early July.108 Th e report painted the United States as an arrogant military power 
and suggested that the Abbottabad raid illustrated Washington’s ‘contemptuous 
disregard of Pakistan’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity’.109 
Condemns the US Drone Strike in Hangu’ (Islamabad, 21 November 2013) www.mofa.gov.pk/
pr-details.php?prID=1565 (accessed 21 May 2014); ‘Pakistan Condemns the US Drone Strike 
in Miranshah’ (Islamabad, 26 December 2013) www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=1631 
(accessed 21 May 2014).
103 See eg ‘Pakistani PM Urges Obama to End Drone Strikes’,  Al Jazeera, 24 October 2013; Paki-
stan, Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, ‘US Ambassador Conveyed Concerns over Drone Strikes’ 
(Islamabad, 2 November 2013) www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=1518, accessed 21 May 
2014; ‘Hagel Holds Talks with Pakistan Leaders’, Al Jazeera, 9 December 2013.
104 UNSC Verbatim Record (26 September 2013) UN Doc S/PV.7036, 14/20: ‘We call for an end to 
the use of drone strikes, as they violate international law, including international humanitarian 
law, and are also detrimental to our eff orts to fi ght terrorism.’
105 UNGA Verbatim Record (27 September 2013) UN Doc A/68/PV.15, 24/51: ‘Th e war against ter-
rorism must be waged within the framework of international law. Th e use of armed drones in 
the border areas of Pakistan is a continued violation of our territorial integrity.’
106 National Assembly of Pakistan, Resolution (10 December 2013) www.na.gov.pk/en/resolution_
detail.php?id=140 (accessed 14 May 2014). 
107 Greg Miller and Bob Woodward, ‘Secret Memos Reveal Explicit Nature of US, Pakistan Agree-
ment on Drones’, Washington Post, 24 October 2013.
108 See http://webapps.aljazeera.net/aje/custom/binladenfi les/Pakistan-Bin-Laden-Dossier.pdf (acces-
sed 22 May 2014); www.documentcloud.org/documents/724833-aljazeera-bin-laden-dossier.
html#document/p230 accessed (22 May 2014). See also Hannah Strange, ‘US Raid that Killed 
bin Laden was “An Act of War”, Says Pakistani Report’, Th e Telegraph, 9 July 2013.
109 Ibid.
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Pakistan protests over cross-border firing by Afghan border 
police
Pakistan lodged strong protest and summoned the Afghan chargé d’aff aires in 
September over the alleged indiscriminate fi ring by the Afghan border police 
near the village of Godwana, resulting in the death of fi ve Pakistani civilians.110
Afghanistan—UN Security Council extends ISAF mandate
On 10 October 2013, the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of 
the Charter, adopted resolution 2120 (2013), extending the authorisation of the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and ‘authorizing’ the Member 
States participating in ISAF ‘to take all necessary measures to fulfi l its man-
date’ (§ 2).
Azerbaijan—Armenia—ongoing violations of the 1994 ceasefire 
in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh region
Th roughout the second semester of 2013, Azerbaijan and Armenia each reported 
on a regular basis to the UN Security Council accusing the other side of vio-
lating the 1994 ceasefi re, providing detailed information about the timing and 
location of the various alleged incidents, the type of ammunition used and the 
resulting casualties (if any). In a letter of 24 July, for instance, Azerbaijan stated 
as follows:
As is known, a fragile ceasefi re in the confl ict between Armenia and Azerbaijan was 
put in place in May 1994. However, the Armenian side regularly and deliberately vio-
lates the ceasefi re by attacking and killing Azerbaijani military personnel as well as 
civilians residing in the territories adjacent to the front line. Over the past years, such 
violations and armed provocations have become more frequent and violent. Th ere-
fore, despite a formal ceasefi re, the Daghlyq Garabagh region and other occupied 
territories of Azerbaijan represent none other than a zone of ongoing hostilities, with 
active terrorist and related organized criminal activity and heavily mined areas.111
Numerous reports were submitted accusing Armenian forces of engaging in 
intensive fi re ‘from their positions in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and 
from the territory of Armenia’.112
110 Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, ‘Pakistan Lodges Strong Protest over the Cross-Border 
Firing by Afghan Border Police’ (Islamabad, 18 September 2013) www.mofa.gov.pk/zahidan/pr-
details.php?prID=1435 (accessed 22 May 2014).
111 Letter dated 24 July 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (24 July 2013) UN Doc S/2013/442.
112 For example: Letter dated 15 July 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the 
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (15 July 2013) UN Doc S/2013/429 (listing 
246 incidents, whereby one member of the armed forces of Azerbaijan was allegedly killed and 
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Armenia similarly reported to the UN Security Council on ‘ongoing viola-
tions of the ceasefi re by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan’.113 Apart 
from listing alleged violations by Azerbaijan (as well as any casualties caused), 
Armenia on several occasions claimed that Azerbaijan overstated the number 
of incidents and presented exaggerated data of ceasefi re violations (not corre-
sponding to Armenia’s own ‘operational data’).114
III. middle east
Iran—US stresses that possible use of force is ‘not off the table’
Following an agreement between Iran and six major powers concerning Iran’s 
nuclear programme, the US Secretary of State noted that, while the US wel-
comed the nuclear deal and believed it was necessary fi rst to exhaust diplomacy, 
it would not take off  the table the possible use of force against Iran.115
another wounded); Letter dated 21 August 2013 from the Chargé d’Aff aires a.i. of the Permanent 
Mission of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (21 August 
2013) UN Doc S/2013/506 (referring to 273 shooting incidents—no casualties reported); Letter 
dated 30 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-General (30 August 2013) UN Doc S/2013/526 (215 incidents—one 
casualty); Letter dated 1 November 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to 
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (1 November 2013) UN Doc S/2013/647 
(222 incidents—one civilian and one member of the armed forces reportedly wounded); Letter 
dated 3 October 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-General (3 October 2013) UN Doc S/2013/589 (271 incidents—one 
civilian wounded); Letter dated 10 December 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Azer-
baijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (10 December 2013) UN Doc 
S/2013/733 (187 incidents—killing one member of the armed forces of Azerbaijan and wound-
ing another).
 
113 Letter dated 5 July 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-General (5 July 2013) UN Doc S/2013/400 (132 incidents—two 
Armenian soldiers reported killed, one wounded); Letter dated 15 October 2013 from the Per-
manent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General 
(15 October 2013) UN Doc S/2013/610 (165 incidents); Letter dated 3 December 2013 from the 
Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General 
(3 December 2013) UN Doc S/2013/718 (177 incidents).
114 Letter dated 16 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (16 August 2013) UN Doc S/2013/497 (‘of the 262 
incidents reported by Azerbaijan  … only 43 coincide with the operational data of the armed 
forces of the Republic of Armenia’); Letter dated 31 October 2013 from the Permanent Rep-
resentative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (31 October 
2013) UN Doc. S/2013/640. 
115 ‘Kerry Says Nuclear Deal Makes Mideast Nations, Israel Safer’, Reuters, 23 November 2013.
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Syrian civil war—Threats of military strikes against Syria in 
reaction to the use of chemical weapons
Th e Ghouta attack
On 21 August 2013, several hundreds of civilians were killed when rockets 
containing sarin nerve gas hit the Ghouta suburb of Damascus.116 Th e Ghouta 
attack led to widespread indignation within the international community. While 
Syria (and Russia) insisted that rebel forces were responsible for the attack, the 
Syrian opposition, as well as the governments of the United States, France and 
the United Kingdom, took the view that it was the work of the Assad regime. In 
a preliminary report117 dated 16 September 2013 and a fi nal report118 dated 12 
December 2013, the ‘United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the 
Use of Chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic’119 confi rmed that sarin 
gas had been used. Some of the fi ndings of the UN inspection team were seen 
as corroborating the view that the rockets were fi red from areas controlled by 
the Syrian regime.120 
Initial reaction: the United States, France and the United Kingdom hint 
at a military response
Following the Ghouta attack, the United States, having previously warned that 
the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime constituted a ‘red line’,121 
quickly hinted at the possibility of a military reaction.122 On 26 August, US 
Secretary of State John Kerry warned that President Obama would seek ‘account-
116 ‘France Says ‘at least 281’ Killed in Syria Chemical Attack’, Daily Star, 2 September 2013; Joby 
Warrick, ‘More than 1,400 Killed in Syrian Chemical Weapons Attack, US Says’, Washington 
Post, 30 August 2013.
117 UN Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab 
Republic, ‘Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus’ 
(16 September 2013) www.un.org/disarmament/content/slideshow/Secretary_General_Report_
of_CW_Investigation.pdf (accessed 24 May 2014).
118 UN Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab 
Republic, ‘Final Report’ (12 December 2013) https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/
uploads/2013/12/report.pdf (accessed 24 May 2014).
119 Th e inspection team had been established already in March 2013 pursuant to allegations by 
Russia and Syria that rebels had used chemical weapons. See eg ibid, § 27; Letter from the Per-
manent Representative of Syria to the United Nations (19 March 2013) UN Doc S/2013/172; 
‘Syria Rebels Made Own Sarin Gas, Says Russia’, Al Jazeera, 10 July 2013.
120 See eg CJ Chivers, ‘Data in Gas Attack Points to Assad’s Top Forces’, New York Times, 18 
September 2013. Russian offi  cials nonetheless attacked the preliminary report as biased and 
incomplete. See eg Steven Lee Myers and Rick Gladstone, ‘Russia Calls UN Chemical Report 
on Syria Biased’, New York Times, 19 September 2013.
121 See the quote from US President Obama in Mark Landler, ‘Obama Th reatens Force against 
Syria’, New York Times, 20 August 2012: ‘We cannot have a situation in which chemical or bio-
logical weapons are falling into the hands of the wrong people  … we have been very clear to 
the Assad regime but also to other players on the ground that this is a red line for us.’
122 On the US reaction, see also: John R Crook, ‘Contemporary Practice of the United States Relat-
ing to International Law’ (2013) 107 American Journal of International Law 900.
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ability for those who would use the world’s most heinous weapons against the 
world’s most vulnerable people’.123 On 30 August, President Obama noted ‘the 
possibility of a limited, narrow act that would help make sure that [Syria] and 
others  … understand that the international community cares about maintain-
ing this chemical weapons band’. He also noted his ‘preference would have been 
that the international community already would have acted’, and expressed frus-
tration over ‘the inability of the Security Council to move in the face of a clear 
violation of international norms’.124
While the United States did not off er a clear international law rationale for 
the envisaged intervention,125 President Obama called the attack ‘an assault on 
human dignity’ that both ‘presents a serious danger to  … national security’ 
and ‘risks making a mockery of the global prohibition on the use of chemical 
weapons’, and that ‘could lead to escalating use of chemical weapons, or their 
proliferation to terrorist groups who would do our people harm’.126 He stressed 
that military action against Syria ‘would be designed to be limited in duration 
and scope. But I’m confi dent we can hold the Assad regime accountable for 
their use of chemical weapons, deter this kind of behavior, and degrade their 
capacity to carry it out.’127
Again, in an ‘address to the nation’ on 10 September 2013, President Obama 
stressed the need to uphold international limits on the use of chemical weapons 
and referred to the ‘national security interests’ of the United States:128
If we fail to act, the Assad regime will see no reason to stop using chemical weapons. 
As the ban against these weapons erodes, other tyrants will have no reason to think 
twice about acquiring poison gas, and using them. Over time, our troops would again 
face the prospect of chemical warfare on the battlefi eld. And it could be easier for 
terrorist organizations to obtain these weapons, and to use them to attack civilians. 
 If fi ghting spills beyond Syria’s borders, these weapons could threaten allies like 
Turkey, Jordan, and Israel. And a failure to stand against the use of chemical weapons 
would weaken prohibitions against other weapons of mass destruction, and embolden 
Assad’s ally, Iran—which must decide whether to ignore international law by building 
a nuclear weapon, or to take a more peaceful path.
123 US Secretary of State John Kerry, ‘Press Briefi ng—Remarks on Syria’ (26 August 2013) www.
state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/08/213503.htm (accessed 19 May 2014).
124 Frederik Pleitgen and Tom Cohen, ‘“War-Weary” Obama Says Syria Chemical Attack Requires 
Response’, CNN, 30 August 2013.
125 See eg Tim Lister, ‘What Justifi es Intervening if Syria Uses Chemical Weapons’, CNN, 28 August 
2013; ‘President Obama: “I Have Not Made a Decision” on Syria’, PBS Newshour, 28 August 
2013.
126 ‘Statement by the President on Syria’, Press Release (Washington, 31 August 2013) www.white-
house.gov/the-press-offi  ce/2013/08/31/statement-president-syria (accessed 19 May 2014).
127 Ibid.
128 US White House, ‘Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria’ (10 September 
2013) www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-offi  ce/2013/09/10/remarks-president-address-nation-syria 
(accessed 19 May 2014).
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 Th is is not a world we should accept. Th is is what’s at stake. And that is why, aft er 
careful deliberation, I determined that it is in the national security interests of the 
United States to respond to the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons through a 
targeted military strike. Th e purpose of this strike would be to deter Assad from 
using chemical weapons, to degrade his regime’s ability to use them, and to make 
clear to the world that we will not tolerate their use.
While President Obama repeatedly asserted that he was not legally required to 
seek Congressional approval, faced with political pressure, he nonetheless con-
sidered that ‘it was right in the absence of a direct or imminent threat to our 
security, to take this debate to Congress’.129 On 6 September 2013, the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee eff ectively approved a temporary ‘Authorization 
for the Use of Military Force against the Government of Syria to Respond to 
Use of Chemical Weapons’.130 Th e resolution refers to the use of force: 
in a limited and specifi ed manner against legitimate military targets in Syria, only 
to—
(1) respond to the use of weapons of mass destruction by the Government of Syria 
in the confl ict in Syria;
(2) deter Syria’s use of such weapons in order to protect the national security inter-
ests of the United States and to protect United States allies and partners against 
the use of such weapons;
(3) degrade Syria’s capacity to use such weapons in the future; and
(4) prevent the transfer to terrorist groups or other state or non-state actors within 
Syria of any weapons of mass destruction.
Th e resolution nonetheless faced opposition in the full Senate as well as in the 
House of Representatives. 131 No further Congressional action was taken.
Next to the United States, France also indicated its support for, and readiness 
to participate in, military strikes against the Assad regime. On 27 August, the 
French foreign minister suggested that a ‘reaction with force’ could be needed if 
Syria were eff ectively found to have used chemical weapons against civilians.132 
President François Hollande similarly expressed support for a unilateral mili-
tary action. Alluding to the diffi  culties in getting any strong action through the 
UN Security Council, and referring to the ‘Responsibility to Protect’,  Hollande 
suggested that ‘international law must evolve with the times. It cannot be a 
129 Ibid. See also Dan Roberts, ‘Obama Seeks Global Backing on Syria: “I Didn’t Set a Red line. Th e 
World Did’, Th e Guardian, 4 September 2013.
130 United States Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, SJ Res 21, 113th Congress (6 September 
2013) www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113sjres21pcs/pdf/BILLS-113sjres21pcs.pdf (accessed 19 
May 2014). Th e authorisation does not extend to the deployment of ground troops in Syria.
131 For example, Karen DeYoung and Ed O’Keefe, ‘Senate Sets Aside Authorization Resolution’, 
Washington Post, 12 September 2013; Joel Achenbach, ‘One-Obvious Congressional Alliances 
Go Out the Window’, Washington Post, 11 September 2013.
132 ‘Syria “Chemical” Attack: France Says Force May be Needed’ BBC News (London, 22 August 
2013)
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pretext to allow mass massacres to be perpetrated.’133 In an interview dated 30 
August, President Hollande confi rmed France’s readiness to participate in a mil-
itary coalition.134 Asked about the legal basis for military strikes, he referred to 
the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons in the 1925 Gas Protocol and 
the fact that the use of gas against the civilian population constituted a crime 
against humanity, as well as to the Security Council’s two-year blockage over 
the situation in Syria. At the same time, President Hollande emphasised that 
any military action would be proportionate and would not aim at overthrow-
ing the regime.
Th e United Kingdom government similarly indicated its willingness to take 
part in a military operation against Syria, with or without backing from the UN 
Security Council.135 On 29 August, the government published a ‘legal position’ 
on ‘Chemical Weapon Use by Syrian Regime’.136 Noting that the use of chemi-
cal weapons by the Syrian regime amounts to a war crime and a crime against 
humanity, the document emphasises that the UK ‘is seeking’ a Chapter VII res-
olution of the UN Security Council that would, among other things, authorise 
Member States ‘to take all necessary measures to protect civilians in Syria from 
the use of chemical weapons and prevent any future use of Syria’s stockpile of 
chemical weapons’ (para 4). It goes on as follows (para 5):
If action in the Security Council is blocked, the UK would still be permitted under 
international law to take exceptional measures in order to alleviate the scale of the 
overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe in Syria by deterring and disrupting the fur-
ther use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. Such a legal basis is available, 
under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, provided three conditions are met:
(i) there is convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international community 
as a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring immedi-
ate and urgent relief;
(ii) it must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the use of 
force if lives are to be saved; and
(iii) the proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to the aim of 
relief of humanitarian need and must be strictly limited in time and scope to this 
aim (ie the minimum necessary to achieve that end and for no other purpose).
133 Quoted in Albert Aji and Gregory Katz, ‘Syria Intervention? Momentum Builds for Western 
Military Action’, Huffi  ngton Post, 27 August 2013.
134 ‘François Hollande au “Monde”: “Il ne s’agit pas de renverser le dictateur syrien”’, Le Monde, 30 
August 2013.
135 Nicholas Watt, ‘Syria Crisis: UK and US Move Closer to Intervention. Foreign Secretary Says 
Britain and Allies Could Intervene in Syria without the Authority of United Nations’, Th e Guard-
ian, 26 August 2013.
136 UK Prime Minister’s Offi  ce, ‘Guidance—Chemical Weapon Use by Syrian Regime: UK Gov-
ernment Legal Position’ (29 August 2013) https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-position/chemical-weapon-use-
by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-position-html-version (accessed 22 May 2014).
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Th e document concludes that each of the cited conditions is met in the case 
at hand:
(i) Th e Syrian regime has been killing its people for two years.  ... Given the Syrian 
regime’s pattern of use of chemical weapons over several months, it is likely that 
the regime will seek to use such weapons again. …
(ii) Previous attempts by the UK and its international partners to secure a resolu-
tion of this confl ict  …  have been blocked over the last two years. If action in 
the Security Council is blocked again, no practicable alternative would remain to 
the use of force to deter and degrade the capacity for the further use of chemical 
weapons by the Syrian regime.
(iii) In these circumstances, and as an exceptional measure on grounds of over-
whelming humanitarian necessity, military intervention to strike specifi c targets 
with the aim of deterring and disrupting further such attacks would be necessary 
and proportionate and therefore legally justifi able. Such an intervention would be 
directed exclusively to averting a humanitarian catastrophe, and the minimum 
judged necessary for that purpose.
In an emergency session, a narrow majority within the British Parliament on 
29 August nonetheless voted against British military action against Syria. Prime 
Minister Cameron subsequently acknowledged that the Parliament ‘does not 
want to see British military action’.137 France indicated that the outcome of the 
UK vote would not change its resolve on the need to act in Syria.138
Support for unilateral military actions by other states
Plans to take action in the form of missile strikes by naval or air forces against 
selected targets were reportedly discussed during a two-day meeting on 25–26 
August in Jordan, attended by the chairman of the US joint chiefs, the head of 
Britain’s armed forces as well as military commanders from ten other Western 
and Middle Eastern countries.139
Several states expressed public support for unilateral military actions against 
Syria. Th e Australian foreign minister, for example, confi rmed that if the use of 
chemical weapons were proven, Australia would support intervention with or 
without the support of the UN: ‘Our preference, everyone’s preference, would be 
for action, a response, under United Nations auspices. But if that’s not possible, 
137 ‘Syria Crisis: Cameron Loses Commons Vote on Syria action’, BBC News, 30 August 2013.
138 Ibid.
139 ‘Military Commanders to Meet in Jordan to Discuss Syria Confl ict’, Al Jazeera, 25 August 2013; 
Ben Farmer, Philip Sherwell and Damein McElroy, ‘Western Attack to Punish Syria Likely to 
Begin with Barrage of More than 100 Missiles in 48 Hour Blitz’, Daily Telegraph, 27 August 
2013. It was reportedly stressed during the meeting that the attacks would be designed to punish 
Assad’s use of chemical weapons rather than to tilt the balance in favour of the rebels.
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the sheer horror of a government using chemical weapons against its people, 
using chemical weapons in any circumstances, mandates a response.’140 
Furthermore, the Turkish foreign minister made it clear that Turkey would 
consider taking part in an international collation against the Syrian regime, 
even if the UN Security Council failed to endorse military action:
We always make it a priority to act in accord with the United Nations and the 
international community. If the Security Council does not reach a decision [to take 
action], we will address other possible options. Th ese alternatives are currently being 
discussed by 36 to 37 countries. If a coalition emerges from these discussions, Turkey 
will be a part of it.141
Kosovo’s Foreign Minister Enver Hoxhaj, expressing support for the notion of a 
unilateral humanitarian intervention, called for a military action replicating the 
NATO intervention model used in Kosovo in 1999.142
In the margin, Israel stressed that it was prepared to ‘act decisively’ to protect 
itself in the event of the Syrian regime launching an attack against it in response 
to a possible US-led military intervention.143
Opposition to possible military strikes—calls for caution
On the other hand, in a letter to the Security Council dated 31 August 2013, 
Syria condemned the threats of ‘military aggression’ against it, and the prepa-
rations undertaken to this end. In so doing, it referred to ‘calls made by the 
international community and the United Nations to abide by the provisions of 
the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law and 
to await the results of the [UN] investigation’ into the events.144
Russia, for its part, while asserting that it ‘did not rule out’ approving a mil-
itary operation in Syria if clear evidence showed Damascus had carried out 
chemical weapons attacks,145 repeatedly criticised suggestions that military inter-
vention could go ahead without a UN Security Council resolution. Th e Russian 
foreign minister underlined that ‘Th e use of force without the sanction of the 
UN Security Council is a grave violation of international law.’146 In a  similar 
140 James Grubel and Mark Bendeich, ‘Australia Backs Action against Syria, With or Without UN 
Approval’, Reuters, 27 August 2013.
141 Harriet Sherwood, Constanze Letsch, Kate Connolly, Alec Luhn and Kim Willsher, ‘Syria Crisis: 
International Views on Intervention’, Th e Guardian, 26 August 2013.
142 Enver Hoxhaj, ‘It’s 1999 in Syria’, Foreign Policy, 23 August 2013.
143 Sherwood et al (n 141).
144 Identical letters dated 31 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab 
Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the 
Security Council (31 August 2013) UN Doc S/2013/520.
145 Th omas Grove, ‘Putin “Does Not Rule Out” Approving Syria Strike with Evidence Assad Used 
Poison Gas’, Reuters, 4 September 2013.
146 Alexei Anischchuk, ‘Russia Warns against Military Intervention in Syria’, Reuters, 26 August 
2013; Sherwood et al, (n 141).
178 Digest of State Practice 1 July–31 December 2013 2014
vein, President Putin stressed that ‘According to current international law, only 
the United Nations Security Council can sanction the use of force against a 
sovereign state. Any other approaches, means, to justify the use of force against 
an independent and sovereign state, are admissible.’147 President Putin reiterated 
this position in an op-ed in the New York Times dated 11 September.148
In a letter dated 24 September to the Security Council, the members of the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization moreover stated the view that ‘external 
intervention, including by force, is unacceptable and may lead to even greater 
destabilization of the situation in the country and far beyond the region. In 
addition, any international intervention in the Syrian confl ict which bypasses the 
[UN] Security Council and violates the Organization’s charter is illegitimate.’149
Offi  cial representatives of the People’s Republic of China also occasionally 
voiced opposition to a unilateral military intervention in Syria. On 11 Sep-
tember 2013, for instance, the spokesperson of the Foreign Ministry stated as 
follows:
Our position on the issue of chemical weapons is consistent. We are fi rmly opposed 
to the use of chemical weapons by anyone. In the meantime, China objects to the 
use or threat of force in international relations. To bypass the Security Council and 
take unilateral military actions goes against the international law and basic norms 
governing international relations and will add to turbulences in Syria and the region 
as a whole.150
In a debate before the UN Security Council on 27 September 2013, China 
against voiced its opposition to ‘the use of force in international relations’, 
stressing that its belief ‘that military means cannot solve the Syrian issue’.151
Pakistan similarly took the view that ‘the sovereignty and integrity of Syria 
must be respected and that there should be no foreign interference in Syria’.152
147 Grove (n 145).
148 Vladimir V Putin, ‘A Plea for Caution from Russia. What Putin Has to Say to Americans about 
Syria’, New York Times, 11 September 2013).
149 Identical letters dated 24 September 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian 
Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the 
Security Council (24 September 2013) UN Doc S/2013/571.
150 China, Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s regular press 
conference on September 11, 2013’ (11 September 2013) www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/
t1075618.shtml (accessed 22 May 2014). See also: China, Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, ‘Foreign 
Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s regular press conference on September 9, 2013’ (9 September 
2013) www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t1074618.shtm (accessed 22 May 2014); China, Min-
istry of Foreign Aff airs, ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s regular press conference on 
September 12, 2013’ (12 September 2013) www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t1076098.shtml 
(accessed 22 May 2014). 
151 UNSC Verbatim Record (27 September 2013) UN Doc S/PV.7038, 9/16.
152 ‘Sovereignty, Integrity of Syria Must Be Respected: Pakistan’, Th e News, 29 August 2013: www.
thenews.com.pk/article-115783-Sovereignty,-integrity-of-Syria-must-be-respected:-Pakistan 
(accessed 22 May 2014).
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Th e legality of unilateral military strikes against Syria was also implicitly 
questioned by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon153 as well as by the United 
Nations and Arab League Special Envoy to Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi.154 Both took 
the position that such strikes would only be lawful if approved by the UN Secu-
rity Council. 
A negotiated outcome
In response to a question during a press conference on 9 September as to what 
the Syrian regime could do to avoid intervention, US Secretary of State John 
Kerry answered that it could immediately turn over all of its chemical weap-
ons to the international community and account for it.155 While the US State 
Department later asserted that this statement was a ‘rhetorical argument’, or 
even a ‘joke’, the invitation was taken seriously by Russia, which proposed that 
Syrian chemical arsenals be moved under international control, in turn averting 
the threat of military strikes. Syria in turn was quick to welcome the proposal 
to place its chemical weapons under international control.156
Following several days of negotiations, the United States and Russia on 14 
September agreed on a ‘Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weap-
ons’, calling for the elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles under 
OPCW supervision by mid-2014.157 Syria immediately hereaft er joined the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. While welcoming the agreement, US President 
Obama insisted that the United States remained ‘prepared to act’ should dip-
lomatic eff orts fail.158 In reaction, the Russian deputy foreign minister noted 
153 Louis Charbonneau, ‘UN’s Ban Casts Doubt on Legality of US Plans to Punish Syria’, Reuters, 
3 September 2013: ‘Th e use of force is lawful only when in exercise of self-defense in accord-
ance with Article 51 of the United Nations charter and/or when the Security Council approves 
of such action’, Ban said. ‘Th at is a fi rm principle of the United Nations’; ‘Syria: With Samples 
en Route to Labs, Ban Calls on Security Council to Develop Response’, UN News Centre, 3 Sep-
tember 2013.
154 Tom Miles, Stephanie Nebehay and Mark Heinrich, ‘Military Intervention in Syria Would Need 
UN Approval: Brahimi’, Reuters, 28 August 2013: ‘I think international law is clear on this. Inter-
national law says that military action must be taken aft er a decision by the Security Council. 
Th at is what international law says.’
155 For example Arshad Mohammed and Andrew Osborn, ‘Kerry: Syrian Surrender of Chemi-
cal Arms Could Stop US Attack’, Reuters, 9 September 2013; Michael R Gordon and Steven L 
Myers, ‘Obama Calls Russia Off er on Syria Possible “Breakthrough”’, New York Times, 9 Septem-
ber 2013.
156 ‘Syria says it “Welcomes” Russian Proposal to Place Chemical Weapons under International 
Control’, CBS News, 9 September 2013.
157 ‘Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons’ (14 September 2013) annexed to 
OPCW Doc EC-M-33/NAT.1 www.opcw.org/fi leadmin/OPCW/EC/M-33/ecm33nat01_e_.pdf 
(accessed 22 May 2014).
158 Steve Holland, ‘Obama Says US Remains Prepared to Act on Syria if Diplomacy Fails’, Reu-
ters, 14 September 2013. A similar position was voiced by the Pentagon press secretary: see eg 
Michael R Gordon, ‘US and Russia Reach Deal to Destroy Syria’s Chemical Arms’, New York 
Times, 14 September 2013.
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that, since ‘[US] plans to punish Damascus [remained] in force  … the threat 
of aggression in violation of international law is so far only delayed, not dis-
missed fully’.159
Eventually, the UN Security Council on 27 September adopted resolu-
tion 2118 (2013), requiring the destruction of all Syrian chemical weapons in 
accordance with the agreed Framework.160 Th e resolution ‘determines’ that ‘the 
use of chemical weapons anywhere constitutes a threat to international peace 
and security’ (para 1). It furthermore ‘condemns in the strongest terms any use 
of chemical weapons in [Syria] … in violation of international law’ (para 2) and 
‘expresses its strong conviction that those individuals responsible for the use of 
chemical weapons in [Syria] should be held accountable’ (para 15). Th e Council 
‘decides’ that Syria ‘shall not use, develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile 
or retain chemical weapons’, or transfer them to other states or non-state actors 
(para 4). Paragraph 21 indicates the possibility of imposing measures under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter in case of non-compliance with the resolution. 
In relation to the latter paragraph, a number of states underlined that it did 
not allow for the automatic use of coercive enforcement measures by individual 
Member States.161
As Syria started to implement the required transfer of its chemical arsenal, 
threats of military action eventually faded. 
Syrian Civil War—third-state assistance to the warring parties 
Th roughout the second half of 2013, reports of third-state assistance to the par-
ties involved in the Syrian civil war continued.162 In September, for instance, the 
Washington Post reported that the CIA had begun delivering weapons (notably 
light weapons and munitions that could be ‘tracked’) to rebels in Syria, as had 
previously been promised by the Obama administration.163 Having previously 
provided Syrian rebels with ‘non-lethal assistance’ French President Hollande 
moreover hinted at arming Syrian rebels.164
159 ‘Russia Fears US Will Still Use Force in Syria’, Al Jazeera, 24 September 2013.
160 UNSC Res 2118 (27 September 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2118. See also: Michael R Gordon, ‘UN 
Deal on Syrian Arms Is Milestone aft er Years of Inertia’, New York Times, 26 September 2013.
161 UNSC Verbatim Record (26 September 2013) UN Doc S/PV.7036, 4/16 (Russia, declaring that 
the resolution ‘does not allow for any automatic use of coercive measures of enforcement’; 
Argentina: ‘it is also clear that should there be non-compliance, it is within the exclusive power 
of the Council to convene in order to assess and take measures that it deems appropriate under 
Chapter VII of the Charter’).
162 For example CJ Chivers and Eric Schmitt, ‘Arms Shipments Seen from Sudan to Syria Rebels’, 
New York Times, 12 August 2013.
163 Ernesto Londoño and Greg Miller, ‘US Weapons Reaching Syrian Rebels’, Washington Post, 12 
September 2013.
164 John Irish and Peter Cooney, ‘France Suggests it is Ready to Give Weapons to Syria Rebels’, 
Reuters, 19 September 2013; ‘France’s Hollande Hints at Arming Syrian Rebels’, France24, 20 
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Syria on numerous occasions complained to the UN Secretary-General 
and the UN Security Council about third-state assistance to the Free Syrian 
army and to other non-state armed groups.165 In a letter dated 5 September, 
for instance, Syria stated that ‘those states that are arming, funding, training 
and providing safe havens for armed terrorists and facilitating their entry into 
Syria are partners in terrorism and complicit in the killing of Syrians’.166 On 
other occasions, Syria accused the third states concerned of violating inter-
national counter-terrorism instruments, including Security Council resolution 
1373(2013). In a letter dated 19 September Syria stated as follows:167
Syria has sent dozens of letters to the Security Council and the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations documenting all that the Syrian Arab Republic has endured over 
the last two and a half years, including direct and indirect aggression, bare-faced 
interference in its internal aff airs, attacks on its sovereignty and independence, and a 
campaign to change its Government and constitutional order by force. …
September 2013. See also Sylvie Corbet, ‘France “Ready to Punish” Syria over Gas Attack’, Huff -
ington Post, 27 August 2013, www.huffi  ngtonpost.com/2013/08/27/france-syria_n_3823398.html 
(accessed 22 May 2014).
165 Identical letters dated 29 July 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Repub-
lic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security 
Council (29 July 2013) UN Doc S/2013/449; Identical letters dated 25 November 2013 from 
the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to 
the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (25 November 2013) UN Doc 
S/2013/690; Identical letters dated 25 November 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the 
Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the Presi-
dent of the Security Council (25 November 2013) UN Doc S/2013/693 (referring to interference 
by Lebanon); Identical letters dated 6 December 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the 
Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the Presi-
dent of the Security Council (6 December 2013) UN Doc S/2013/723 (referring to assistance 
by Turkey); Identical letters dated 24 December 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the 
Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the Presi-
dent of the Security Council (24 December 2013) UN Doc S/2013/766 (referring to interference 
by Saudi Arabia); Identical letters dated 9 December 2013 from the Permanent Representa-
tive of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and 
the President of the Security Council (9 December 2013) UN Doc S/2013/727 (referring to 
interference by Saudi Arabia); Identical letters dated 16 December 2013 from the Permanent 
Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-
General and the President of the Security Council (16 December 2013) UN Doc S/2013/743 
(accusing Israel of providing rebels with logistical assistance); UN Doc S/2013/762 (24 Decem-
ber 2013); Identical letters dated 24 December 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the 
Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the Presi-
dent of the Security Council (24 December 2013) UN Doc S/2013/762.
 
166 Letter dated 5 September 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic 
to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (5 September 2013) 
UN Doc S/2013/529. See also Letter dated 4 November 2013 from the Permanent Representative 
of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security 
Council (4 November 2013) UN Doc A/68/572-S/2013/644 
167 Identical letters dated 19 September 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab 
Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the 
Security Council (19 September 2013) UN Doc S/2013/563.
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 Th e United States of America, France, Britain, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, 
along with certain other states, are continuing to support, fund, arm, recruit and 
dispatch terrorists to Syria, in clear violation of the rules and principles of interna-
tional law and the principles governing international relations and goodneighbourly 
relations, as well as the Security Council resolutions concerning counter-terrorism. 
Th ey are also acting in clear and blatant violation of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the 
Charter of the United Nations. …
 Th ey are furthermore in blatant violation of … General Assembly resolution 3314 
(XXIX), to which is annexed the Defi nition of Aggression; General Assembly reso-
lution 2625 (XXV) of 1970, to which is annexed the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among states in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, …; General Assembly resolution 
42/22, to which is annexed the Declaration on the Enhancement of the Eff ective-
ness of the Principle of Refraining from the Th reat or Use of Force in International 
Relations;  …
 Th e Syrian Arab Republic would like to draw the attention of the Security Council, 
the Secretary-General and the countries of the world to these clear acts of aggression 
that are being committed by the United States of America, Britain, France, Turkey, 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar and certain other states through their ongoing support for ter-
rorism, their blatant interference in Syria’s internal aff airs and their attacks on Syria.’
In a Security Council meeting on 16 July, Iraq called on all sides ‘to cease pro-
viding fi nancial and military support to all militias and militant groups, which 
we believe can only further complicate matters’.168
Syrian civil war—spillover effects
While the Syrian regime condemned third-state intervention in support of rebel 
forces, neighbouring countries in turn repeatedly spoke out, or acted, against 
spillover eff ects of the Syrian civil war.
Jordan, for instance, provided the UN Security Council with two notes ver-
bales previously communicated to the Syrian embassy in Amman, in which it 
complained of shelling of Jordanian territory.169 In the fi rst note verbale, for 
instance, Jordan
note[d] with regret the growing number of violations of Jordanian territory caused 
by various types of shelling and gunfi re from the Syrian side of the border’ infl ict-
ing damage on civilians, the Jordanian armed forces and public and private property. 
It stressed that Syria ‘must bring an end to the violations  … and take all necessary 
measures to ensure that no shells or bullets land on Jordanian territory.170
168 UNSC Verbatim Record (16 July 2013) UN Doc S/PV.7000 at 11/13.
169 Letter dated 7 October 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council (16 October 
2013) UN Doc S/2013/595.
170 Ibid.
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Lebanon similarly complained before the UN Security Council that ‘increasing 
cross-border fi re and incursions from Syria into Lebanon [were] threatening 
[its] security and stability’.171 It ‘strongly condemn[ed] all such acts, whoever 
their perpetrators may be and whatever their alleged reasons’. On 17 July, mili-
tants assassinated a well-known supporter of the Syrian president in Lebanon 
in an attack that was allegedly the work of members of the Syrian rebel oppo-
sition.172 In a Presidential Statement, the UN Security expressed ‘deep concern 
at all violations of Lebanon’s sovereignty’:
As the impact of the Syrian crisis on Lebanon’s stability and security becomes more 
and more apparent, the Security Council underscores its growing concern at the 
marked increase of cross-border fi re from the Syrian Arab Republic into Lebanon, 
which caused death and injury among the Lebanese population, as well as incursions, 
abductions, and arms traffi  cking across the Lebanese–Syrian border. Th e Security 
Council also expresses its concern at all other border violations. Th e Security Coun-
cil echoes President Michel Sleiman’s protest,  … at such repeated shelling from the 
confl icting parties, including by the Syrian Arab armed Forces and Syrian armed 
opposition groups that violate Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.173
Furthermore, the Council noted with ‘deep concern’ new developments with 
regard to the involvement of Lebanese parties in the fi ghting in Syria and urged 
all parties in Lebanon to avoid a ‘slide into confl ict’ and recommit to Lebanon’s 
policy of disassociation. 
Th ere were also recurrent reports of incidents along the Syrian border with 
Turkey. Th us, on 17 July stray bullets from Syria killed two persons in a Turkish 
border town.174 Turkish troops returned fi re. One week later, a Turkish border 
patrol killed one of eight civilians trying to cross illegally from Turkey into 
Syria.175 And in September, Turkish warplanes shot down a Syrian helicopter 
aft er it crossed into Turkish airspace.176 According to Turkey, repeated warnings 
had been given before the helicopter was shot down. Th e Turkish foreign minis-
ter declared that ‘Turkey will defi nitely not allow any violation of its border. … 
We will defend our borders and our people’s security to the end.’177 In turn, in 
a statement by the state news agency SANA, Syria accused Turkey of escalat-
ing the situation:
171 UNSC Verbatim Record (16 July 2013) UN Doc S/PV.7000 at 9/13.
172 Oliver Holmes and Andrew Heavens, ‘Militants Assassinate Pro-Assad Syrian in Lebanon’, Reu-
ters, 17 July 2013.
173 UNSC Presidential Statement 9 (2013) UN Doc S/PRST/2013/9.
174 Seyhmus Cakan, ‘Stray Bullets from Syria Kill Two in Turkish Border Town’, Reuters, 17 July 
2013.
175 Jonathan Burch, ‘Turkish Troops Kill Civilian Trying to Cross into Syria’, Reuters, 23 July 2013.
176 Saif Tawfi qu, ‘Turkish Warplanes Shoot Down Syrian Helicopter’, Reuters, 16 September 2013.
177 Ibid. See also: ‘Turkey says will Inform UN, NATO on Syrian Helicopter Downing’, Reuters, 16 
September 2013.
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Th e hasty response from the Turkish side, especially as the aircraft  was on its way 
back and was not charged with any combat missions, is proof of the true intentions 
of [Turkey] toward Syria to increase tensions and escalate the situation on the border 
between the two countries.
Last but not least, Israel submitted several letters to the UN Security Council 
with regard to violations of the buff er zone on the Golan Heights as well as 
attacks with mortar shells fi red from Syria. Th us, on 16 July, Israel informed 
the Security Council that
Th e fasting and prayers of thousands of Israelis commemorating the Jewish holiday of 
Tisha B’Av were interrupted by a barrage of mortar shells fi red from Syria.  … Israel 
has thus far shown maximum restraint.  … However, the Israeli Government will 
not allow its citizens to be the ongoing victims of these attacks and will continue to 
exercise its right to self-defence, as appropriate, and take all necessary measures to 
protect its population.178
During a Security Council debate on 23 July, Israel similarly drew attention to 
attacks with mortar shells and violations of the buff er zone by Syrian tanks and 
armoured vehicles, in defi ance of the 1974 Separation of Forces Agreement.179 
It warned that ‘[i]f provocations by the Syrian government continue, Israel will 
have no choice but to respond accordingly’.180 In a letter dated 9 October 2013, 
Israel informed the Security Council that it had responded to mortar shells 
being fi red into northern Israel by returning fi re to the Syrian military outpost 
from where the shells had originated.181 In relation to another shooting incident 
in December whereby a Syrian soldier allegedly opened fi re from Syrian territo-
ries towards an Israeli military outpost, Israel against stressed that it could not 
‘be expected to stand by as its soldiers and citizens are repeatedly put at risk’.182
In turn, according to US offi  cials, Israel in July conducted an air strike in 
Syria targeting advanced missiles sold to Syria by Russia.183 Israel declined to 
comment on the strikes. During the Security Council debate of 23 July, Iran, 
speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement moreover condemned the 
Israeli air strikes against targets near Damascus that took place on 5 May 
178 Identical letters dated 16 July 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (16 July 
2013) UN Doc S/2013/425.
179 UNSC Verbatim Record (23 July 2013) UN Doc S/PV.7007, 10/57.
180 Ibid.
181 Identical letters dated 9 October 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (9 Octo-
ber 2013) UN Doc S/2013/601.
182 Identical letters dated 2 December 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the 
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council 
(2 December 2013) UN Doc S/2013/711 See also: Maayan Lubell and Crispian Balmer, ‘Israel 
Says Returns Fire into Syria on Occupied Golan Heights’, Reuters, 2 December 2013.
183 Michael R Gordon, ‘Israel Airstrike Targeted Advanced Missiles that Russia Sold to Syria, US 
Says’, New York Times, 13 July 2013.
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(allegedly carried out in an attempt to destroy Iranian missiles bound for Hez-
bollah184) as an ‘act of aggression’ by Israel.185 Other states took a more cautious 
approach urging on both states not to let things escalate.186
In a resolution adopted on 18 December, the Security Council ‘strongly 
condemn[ed] the recent intense fi ghting in the area of separation and [called] 
on all parties to the Syrian domestic confl ict to cease military actions in the 
UNDOF area of operation’.187 Th e Council stressed that both parties should 
abide by the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement and scrupulously 
observe the ceasefi re.
Israel–Lebanon 
Violations of the ‘Blue Line’
Tension remained high along the UN-established ‘Blue Line’ between Israel and 
Lebanon. 
Lebanon submitted numerous letters to the UN Security Council complain-
ing of Israeli incursions by land, sea or air.188 It consistently asserted that ‘[t]hese 
acts are a blatant violation of [Lebanon’s] sovereignty and the relevant interna-
tional resolutions, including Security Council resolution 1701(2006). Th ey are 
184 Dominic Evans and Oliver Holmes, ‘Israel Strikes Syria, says Targeting Hezbollah Arms’, Reuters, 
5 May 2013.
185 UNSC Verbatim Record (23 July 2013) UN Doc S/PV.7007, 45/57. See also: ibid, 41 (Syria: simi-
larly condemning the Israeli ‘aggression’ that took place on 5 May).
186 For example ibid, 17 (Republic of Korea, ‘strongly condemn[ing] all fi ring across and within the 
area of separation adjacent to the Golan Heights’), 56 (Peru).
187 UNSC Res 2131 (18 December 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2131.
188 Identical letters dated 1 July 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (1 July 
2013) UN Doc S/2013/409; Identical letters dated 19 July 2013 from the Permanent Represent-
ative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President 
of the Security Council (19 July 2013) UN Doc S/2013/437; Identical Letters dated 4 Septem-
ber 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to 
the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (4 September 2013) UN Doc 
S/2013/527; Identical letters dated 11 October 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Leba-
non to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security 
Council (11 October 2013) UN Doc S/2013/604; Identical Letters dated 4 November 2013 from 
the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-
General and the President of the Security Council (4 November 2013) UN Doc S/2013/658; 
Identical letters dated 25 November 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the 
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council 
(25 November 2013) UN Doc S/2013/713; Identical letters dated 12 July 2013 from the Per-
manent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General 
and the President of the Security Council (12 July 2013) UN Doc S/2013/418 (also accusing of 
having opened fi re on a civilian fi shing within Lebanese territory without hitting him).
186 Digest of State Practice 1 July–31 December 2013 2014
also a fl agrant contravention of the Charter of the United Nations and the prin-
ciples and provisions of international law.’189
Conversely, Israel complained of dozens of ‘breaches of Israeli sovereignty’ in 
violation of Security Council resolution 1701(2006) by Lebanon.190 In particular, 
in a letter dated 16 December 2013,191 Israel accused Lebanese armed forces 
of having engaged in an ‘unprovoked attack’, killing an Israeli soldier driving 
in Israeli territory, and warning that ‘provocations and breaches of Israeli sov-
ereignty will not be tolerated’. An Israeli army spokesperson declared that: ‘We 
will not tolerate aggression against the state of Israel and maintain the right to 
exercise self-defence.’192
And when on 29 December, fi ve rockets were fi red from southern Lebanon 
towards Israel, Israel responded with ‘massive shelling toward the launch area’.193 
Prime Minister Netanyahu warned that Israel held ‘the Lebanese government 
responsible for fi ring that is carried out from within its territory’.194 In a letter 
to the Security Council dated 30 December 2013,195 Israel stated as follows:
Yesterday, the early morning calm in northern Israel was once again shattered by a 
barrage of rockets fi red from Lebanon towards the northern Israeli town of Kiryat 
Shmona.
Th e Government of Israel holds the Lebanese government responsible for the escala-
tion of violence in recent weeks. In addition to the wave of rockets, armed fi ghters 
have been fi ring across the Blue Line into northern Israel throughout the month of 
December. And just last week, a member of the Lebanese Armed Forces shot and 
killed an Israeli, Shlomi Cohen, while he was driving in a civilian vehicle inside 
Israel. …
189 For example, Identical letters dated 11 October 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Leb-
anon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security 
Council (11 October 2013) UN Doc S/2013/604.
190 Letter dated 13 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations 
addressed to the President of the Security Council (13 August 2013) UN Doc S/2013/486; Letter 
dated 12 September 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations 
addressed to the President of the Security Council (12 September 2013) UN Doc S/2013/546; 
Letter dated 8 October 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations 
addressed to the President of the Security Council (8 October 2013) UN Doc S/2013/596; Letter 
dated 23 October 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations 
addressed to the President of the Security Council (23 October 2013) UN Doc S/2013/626.
191 Identical letters dated 16 December 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the 
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council 
(16 December 2013) UN Doc S/2013/745.
192 Quoted in ‘Israeli Soldier Killed near Lebanon border’, Al Jazeera, 15 December 2013.
193 William Booth, ‘Israel Fires Artillery Shells into Lebanon aft er Rockets Fall’, Washington Post, 
29 December 2013.
194 Ibid.
195 Identical letters dated 30 December 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the 
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council 
(30 December 2013) UN Doc S/2013/780.
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 Israel has shown maximum restraint, but will continue to exercise its right to self-
defence, as appropriate, and will take all necessary measures to protect its citizens.
Other incidents
Several other incidents took place involving Israeli–Lebanese relations. Th us, 
on 23 August the Israeli military reported that its jets had bombed a ‘terror 
site’ near a coastal town south of Beirut in reaction to a barrage of four rockets 
launched at northern Israel the day before.196 Th e Popular Front for the Lib-
eration of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) said one of its bases had 
been hit. On 4 December, senior Hezbollah commander Hassan al-Laqees was 
gunned down outside his home in Hadath, south of Beirut.197 Hezbollah imme-
diately issued a statement accusing Israel of the assassination. Yet, Israel stated 
it had nothing to do with the incident. Other sources suggested that the killing 
might rather be linked to the Lebanon’s soaring sectarian tensions.198
Israel—Palestine—incidents in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip 
Multiple incidents occurred in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. On 26 August, 
three Palestinians were killed by Israeli police when a large crowd attacked 
police with ‘stones and petrol bombs’ during an Israeli arrest operation in the 
Qalandiya refugee camp on the West Bank.199 In late September 2013, two Israeli 
soldiers were killed in separate incidents in the West Bank city of Hebron.200 
On 22 October, Israeli forces killed a suspected Palestinian fi ghter—wanted for 
his alleged involvement in a Tel Aviv bus bombing the year before—during an 
exchange of fi re near the village of Bilin in the West Bank.201 And, in Decem-
ber, a Palestinian sniper killed an Israeli defence ministry employee near the 
border with the Gaza Strip.202 Israel responded by shutting down its main cargo 
crossing to the Gaza Strip and by launching an air and artillery assault, killing a 
Palestinian girl. A Hamas spokesperson denounced the Israeli actions as a ‘col-
lective punishment’ of the Gaza population.203
196 ‘Israeli Jets Bomb Lebanon Target aft er Rocket Strike’, BBC News, 23 August 2013.
197 Liz Sly and Loveday Morris, ‘Hezbollah Commander Hassan al-Laqees Assassinated outside his 
Beirut Home’, Washington Post, 4 December 2013.
198 Ibid.
199 ‘Palestinians Killed in Clashes with Israeli’, BBC News, 26 August 2013.
200 ‘Clashes in Hebron aft er Israeli Troop Deaths’, Al Jazeera, 24 September 2013.
201 ‘Israeli Forces Kill Palestinian in West Bank’, Al Jazeera, 22 October 2013.
202 Calev Ben-David and Saud Abu Ramadan, ‘Israel Shuts Gaza Crossing aft er Worker Shot Dead 
at Fence’, Bloomberg, 25 December 2013.
203 Ibid.
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Yemen—US drone strike—resolution of the Yemen parliament
Th roughout the second semester of 2013, the United States continued to con-
duct drone strikes against suspected al-Qaeda members within Yemeni territory. 
On 30 July, for instance, three suspected al-Qaeda members were allegedly 
killed in the second such attack in three days, according to a Yemeni military 
offi  cial and tribal sources.204
In another incident, at least 14 people were reportedly killed and 22 injured, 
when on 12 December, a US drone mistakenly targeted a wedding convoy in 
Yemen’s al-Baitha province aft er intelligence reports identifi ed the vehicles as car-
rying al-Qaeda militants.205 In reaction, the Yemeni parliament on 15 December 
passed a (non-binding) resolution—mere days aft er the Pakistani parliament 
voted a similar resolution (see supra)—condemning US drone attacks.206 Th e 
resolution stressed ‘the importance of protecting all citizens from any aggres-
sion’ as well as the ‘importance of preserving the sovereignty of Yemeni air 
space’.
VI. Other
UN General Assembly urges the international community to 
ensure that drone strikes comply with international law
On 18 December 2013, the UN General Assembly adopted (without a vote) 
resolution 68/178 on the ‘Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms while Countering Terrorism’.207 Th e resolution inter alia calls upon states, 
when countering terrorism, to
ensure that any measures taken or means employed to counter terrorism, including 
the use of remotely piloted aircraft , comply with their obligations under international 
law, including the Charter of the United Nations, human rights law and international 
humanitarian law, in particular the principles of distinction and proportionality.
It also stresses the urgent and imperative need to seek agreement between 
states on the legal questions pertaining to the use of drones. Th e resolution 
was adopted not long aft er Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch 
released separate reports detailing the deaths of dozens of civilians as a result 
204 ‘US Drone Kills al-Qaeda Suspects in Yemen’, Al Jazeera, 30 July 2013.
205 Hakim Almasmari, ‘Yemen says US Drone Struck a Wedding Convoy, Killing 14’, CNN, 13 
December 2013.
206 ‘Yemeni Parliament Votes to Ban Drone Attacks’, RT, 16 December 2013: http://rt.com/news/
yemen-parliament-bans-drones-294/ (accessed 25 May 2014); ‘Yemeni Parliament in Non-Bind-
ing Vote against Drone Attacks’, Reuters, 15 December 2013.
207 UNGA Res 68/178, ‘Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering 
Terrorism’ (18 December 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2098.
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of US drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen, and accusing the United States of 
breaking international law and perhaps committing war crimes208—accusations 
that were vehemently denied by the US authorities.209 Th ree months earlier, the 
prime minister of Pakistan had strongly raised the issue of drone attacks in his 
address to the General Assembly on 27 September, denouncing them as a con-
tinued violation of Pakistan’s integrity and as detrimental to eff orts to eliminate 
extremism and terrorism210 (see also supra).
Security Council condemns terrorist attacks/attacks against 
embassies
Th roughout the second Semester of 2013, the Security Council on repeated 
occasions condemned specifi c terrorist attacks and attacks against embassies.
On 29 July 2013, the Council condemned the suicide car bomb attack against 
the Turkish embassy in Mogadishu, Somalia, on 27 July, resulting in one death 
and leaving several others wounded.211
On 4 October, it adopted a similar press statement in relation to the attack 
against the Russian embassy in Tripoli, Libya, on 2 October, thereby calling on 
Libya to protect diplomatic and consular property and personnel in accordance 
with its international obligations in this regard.212
On 28 November, the Council condemned the shelling of the Russian 
embassy in Damascus, Syria, killing one and wounding nine people including 
among the embassy security personnel.213
Finally, on 29 and 30 December, respectively, the Security Council adopted 
press statements condemning in the strongest terms two terrorist attacks that 
occurred in Volgograd (Russia), in the run-up to the winter Olympics in Sochi, 
both of which resulted in numerous deaths and injuries.214
208 Susan Cornwell and Mark Hosenball, ‘US Broke International Law by Killing Civilians with 
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